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Diversity, Democracy & Pluralism:
Confronting the Reality of Our
Inequality
by Stacy Hawkins*
"[Ihf liberty and equality ...are chiefly to be found in democracy, they
will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to
the utmost."
Aristotle1
"The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only
that all power should be derived from the people, but that.., the trust
should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands."
James Madison'
INTRODUCTION
African-Americans were inspired by the election of Barack Obama as
the first African-American President of the United States.' Women
were energized by even the prospect of electing the first female President
I.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law. University of Virginia (B.A-);
Georgetown University Law Center (J.D.). I would like to thank the Rutgers Junior
Faculty Colloquium, in particular Jean Galbraith and Katie Eyer, for their insightful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank participants at the
following conferences whose questions, comments, and suggestions helped develop this from
an idea to a fully realized project: the Mid-Atlantic Law and Society Association, the Lutie
Lytle Conference, and the Law and Society Annual Conference. The following readers,
moderators, and commentators deserve special thanks: Rhonda Reaves, Ben Davis, and
Vinay Harpilani.
1. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 156 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Dover Publications, Inc. 2000)
(1885).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 268 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
3. See Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and
the Price of Democracy, 86 DENy. U. L. REv. 1023, 1023 (2009).
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of the United States.4 Latinos expressed pride in the confirmation of
Justice Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court.' And a
movie was made immortalizing Harvey Milk, the first openly gay
politician elected to public office in the United States.6 This list of
celebrated "firsts" goes on and on.7 All too often in the twenty-first
century, we have either celebrated diversity among our civic leaders as
a novelty,8 or otherwise decried their lack of diversity In the past

4. See Anne E. Kornblut & Matthew Mosk, Clinton Owes Lead in Poll To Support From
Women, WASH. POST (June 12, 2007), httpJ/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/06/11/AR2007061102216.html. Notwithstanding her primary defeat to Barack
Obama, Hillary Clinton's presidential run in the 2008 Democratic primary garnered so
much support among women voters that John McCain chose a then virtually unknown
female governor as his presidential running mate during the general election. See Michael
Cooper & Elisabeth Bumiller, Alaskan Is McCain's Choice; First Women on G.O.P. Ticket,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2008) http'/www.nytimes.comn2008/08/30/us/politics/29palin.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0. Sarah Palin burst onto the national political stage during the 2008
campaign and remains a potential candidate for the 2016 presidential race. See Charlotte
Allen, Op-Ed., Hey GOP,Take the Palin Cure, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2012), http://articles.
latimes.com/2012/nov/18/opinion/la-oe.alen-palin-for-president.20121118.
5. See, e.g., DIANA EVANS ET AL., WHO'S ON THE BENCH? THE IMPACT OF DESCRIPTIVE
LATINO REPRESENTATION ON SUPREME COURT APPROVAL, APSA 2011 ANNUAL MEETING
PAPER (2011), httpJ/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1gO1425&downloadyes;
Juan Gonzalez, Day of Pride for Latinos as Obama Nominates Sonia Sotomayor for
Supreme Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 26, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/pol
itics/day-pride-latinos-obama-nominates-sonia-sotmayor-supreme-court-article-1.377567.
6. See, e.g., John Cloud, The PioneerHarvey Milk, TIME (June 14, 1999), httpj/www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,991276,00.htnl#ixzz2aSL10gz8 (recognizing Milk as
"the first openly gay man elected to any substantial political office in the history of the
planet"); see also Offwial Site: Milk, Focus FEATURES, www.focusfeatures.com/milk (last
visited Oct. 20, 2014) (describing the movie based on the life of Harvey Milk, starring Sean
Penn as Milk, and detailing how both the movie and Penn were nominated for Academy
Awards).
7. Examples of these celebrated "firsts" include Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, the
first Indian-American governor, see Adam Nossiter, A Son of Immigrants Rises in a
Southern State, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/us/221ou
isiana.html?ref=bobbyjindal&_r=l&; New Mexico Governor Susana Martinez, the first
female Hispanic governor, see Lisa Mascaro, FirstHispanicFemale GovernorPitches GOP
Brand, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/29/news/la
pnsusana-martinez-gop-speech-20120829; Hawaiian Senator Mazie Hirono, the first female
Asian Senator, see Laura Bassett, Mazie Hirono, FirstAsian-American Female Senator,
Sworn In: 'There Need to be More of Us in Here', HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 3, 2013),
httpJ/www.hufrmgtonpost.com/2013/01/03/mazie-hirono-sworn-inn2404267.html; and Eric
Holder, the first African-American Attorney General of the United States, see Donna
Leinwand & Kevin Johnson, Holder a Historic Pick for A.G., with Big ChallengesAhead,
USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politis/2008-12-O1hol
derN.htm, to name just a few.
8. See generally supra note 7.
9. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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generation, as the demographic diversity of the nation has rapidly
expanded,1" racial and ethnic minorities have remained shut out of
participation in the civic life of our nation.1 1 This disparity between
the pluralism of our population and the pluralism of our polity challenges our fundamental democratic ideal of "government of the people, by the
people, for the people."12 This Article attempts to answer the question
13
of whether our Constitution's promise of "equal protection of the laws"
offers any guarantee against this yawning racial and ethnic gap between
the governing and the governed. If all persons alike do not get to share
in the promise of liberty and equality described in the introductory
quotes to this Article, some people-racial and ethnic minorities in
particular-will be forever consigned to the margins of this ongoing social
14
The conclusion reached is
experiment in democracy called America.
that this untenable reality is not consistent with the vision of our
Constitution's guarantee of either equal protection or pluralist democracy.
To its great credit, in 2003, the United States Supreme Court took
direct aim at this failure of our democracy by holding in Grutter v.
Bollinger'5 that achieving meaningful diversity in higher education

10. See infra note 338.
11. See infra notes 351-53. In 2009, Conrad Johnson documented an alarming shut-out
rate of racial and ethnic minorities (African-Americans and Latinos in particular) from law
school admission. See Conrad Johnson, A Disturbing Trend in Law School Diversity,
COLUMBIA UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http'J/blogs.law.columbia.edu/salt/ (last visited Oct. 20,
2014). This data foreshadows a continued dearth of racial and ethnic minorities in public
leadership given the concentration of public leaders who matriculate through law school.
See id.; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (recognizing that many of
the nation's civic leaders are cultivated in law school).
12. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (emphasis added).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1.
14. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Alfred A. Knopf 1994) (1840)

(referring to America as a social experiment). In 1903, W.E.B. DuBois proclaimed about
the United States that the "problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the colorline." W.E.B. DuBois, SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (Library of Am. 1990). It is quite possible

that the color line will remain the problem of the twenty-first century if we are not able
to effectively incorporate racial and ethnic minorities into our polity, notwithstanding the
prevailing social and legal norms of non-discrimination. See discussion infra Parts III.B.,

IV.The overwhelmingly negative response to the 2014 Coca-Cola Super Bowl ad depicting
images of our pluralist nation running over a soundtrack of America the Beautiful sung in
various languages demonstrates the continued resistance to embracing racial and ethnic
minorities as full members of, and equal participants in, our democracy. See Gary Younge,
Coca-Cola'sSuper Bowl Ad Showed That Some Americans Still Can't Take Diversity, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2014), http-J/www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/09/coca-cola-

super-bowl-ad-america-diversity.
15. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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could justify the use of race-conscious admissions plans, notwithstanding
the Court's general inclination toward constitutional colorblindness,
precisely because the diversity of our civic leaders, cultivated in the
nation's public colleges and universities, would instill in the hearts and
minds of the American people a sense of legitimacy in those leaders. 6
The Court justified this "diversity rationale," at least in part, by
observing that "[elffective participation by members of all racial and
ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of
one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized." 7 Many critics have assailed
this diversity rationale as an illegitimate basis for permitting raceconsciousness under the prevailing equal protection principle of
antidiscrimination."5 Although progressive legal scholars have come to
the able defense of the race-conscious admissions program sanctioned by
the Court in Grutter, most have done so without defending the diversity
rationale itself, but by rejecting the antidiscrimination principle
wholesale in favor of an antisubordination principle of equal protection.' 9
This debate between the antisubordination and antidiscrimination
principles of equal protection, the "mediating principles" of equal
protection, has been long-standing. 0 The antisubordination principle

16. See id. at 332-34. In Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), the Court again
addressed the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions. Notwithstanding some
refinement of the standard for determining when race-conscious measures might be
necessary to achieve student-body diversity, the Court in Fisher affirmed the diversity
rationale adopted in Grutter. Id. at 2419.
17. Grutter,539 U.S. at 325,332. The Court also noted that the diversity rationale was
supported by the educational goals of improving classroom discussion and preparing
students for work in a global economy. Id. at 330.
18. It was acknowledged that the Court's recognition in Grutter of any interest other
than remedying past discrimination as "compelling" under the prevailing equal protection
strict scrutiny standard would be significant. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Maimon
Schwarzschild, Race Matters,UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER
SERIES 21 (2013), available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=2239978; Cf Steven J. Caldas, The
Plessy and Grutter Decisions: A Study in Contrast and Comparison, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 67,
72 (2006) (questioning the Court's reasoning in analyzing the alleged compelling interest
in diversity).
19. See, e.g., Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity
Rationale on White Identity Formation,89 N.Y.U. L. REv. 425 (2014); Trina Jones, The
Diversity Rationale:A ProblematicSolution, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 171 (2005); Kenneth
B. Nunn, Diversity as a Dead-End, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 705 (2008); Girardeau Spann, The
Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221 (2004); see also Charles R. Lawrence III,
Each Other'sHarvest: Diversity'sDeeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757 (1997) (assailing
diversity before the Grutter decision).
20. See Stacy L. Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity: Moving Beyond the
Affirmative Action Debate to Embrace a 21st Century View of Equality, 2 COLUM. J. RACE
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can be thought of as the remedial principle of equal protection, and the
antidiscrimination principle can be thought of as the aspirational
principle.2 ' However, antisubordination is also commonly associated
with a command of substantive equality and race-consciousness, and
antidiscrimination is associated with a command of formal equality and
colorblindness.22 Generally, the debate between antisubordination and
antidiscrimination presumes that these two principles, and their
preference for race-consciousness and colorblindness respectively, are
mutually exclusive and jurisprudentially irreconcilable.2 This debate
further assumes that a single, dominant, fixed, and24 inviolate principle
of equality informs our equal protection guarantee.
The diversity rationale, however, with its acknowledgement of
aspirational colorblindness and its acquiescence to substantive raceconsciousness, confounds the presumptions about, and the understanding
of, the equal protection doctrine reflected in this debate. The diversity
rationale defies the conventional view by combining the aspirational
ideals of the antidiscrimination principle with the substantive-equality
view commonly associated with the antisubordination principle. In doing
so, it reveals that the Court's equal protection jurisprudence is not
confined to the narrow terms echoed in the scholarly debate, but reflects
a dynamic, evolving, and responsive approach to equal protection that
can accommodate, and has accommodated, both of these visions of
equality over time.
Much of the critique over the legitimacy of the diversity rationale
specifically, and the animating principle of equal protection doctrine
more generally, ends with this debate. However, there are additional
constitutional considerations that structure the Court's equal protection
analysis generally, and that should inform our understanding of the
diversity rationale specifically as a coherent part of that analysis. This

& L. 75, 90-91 (2012) [hereinafter Hawkins, A DeliberativeDefense of Diversity].
21. But see id. at 91 (describing both the antisubordination and the antidiscrimination
principles as remedial). The formal antidiscrimination principle I have described before
can be seen as attending to remedial concerns, as embodied by Chief Justice Roberts'
famous line in ParentsInvolved in Community Schools v. Seattle School DistrictNo. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007), that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race." Id. at 748. However, this paper also acknowledges
the claim by proponents of the antidiscrimination principle that it vindicates the original
and aspirational constitutional principle of colorblindness embodied by Justice Harlan's
infamous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), "Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Id. at 559.
22. See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Article contemplates those additional constitutional considerations and
how they reinforce the legitimacy of the diversity rationale, even as it
situates the Court's equal protection doctrine in a broader jurisprudential framework. Rather than the one-dimensional analysis that is
reflected in the literature, the Court's equal protection analysis is
marked by four simultaneously reinforcing constructs that together form
an integrated framework within which the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence is developed and the diversity rationale ought to be
understood. This Article seeks to fill the gap between the narrow
critique of the diversity rationale found in the existing literature and the
robust jurisprudential framework from which the diversity rationale has
emerged, and by which it is legitimized.
25
These four constructs, often treated in the literature separately,
include not only the mediating principles that dominate the scholarly
debate around equal protection, 26 but also a theory of democracy,27 a
theory of judicial review,2 and a method of constitutional interpreta-

25. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MMORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (addressing the representation-reinforcement theory

of judicial review in the context of voting rights); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Pluralist
Theory of the Equal Protection Clause, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1239 (2009) [hereinafter
Eskridge, A Pluralist Theory] (addressing a pluralist theory of democracy in regards to
equal protection); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 107 (1976) (addressing the mediating principles of equal protection); ROBERT C. POST,
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, YALE LAW SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY (1990), available at http:/digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss-papers/209

(addressing various methods of constitutional interpretation).
26. The two dominant mediating principles are antisubordination and antidiscrimination. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Racial Inclusion, Exclusion and Segregation in
Constitutional Law, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2012) (describing the equal protection

discourse as a debate between antisubordination and antidiscrimination principles); Fiss,
supra note 25; Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in ConstitutionalStruggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1470 (2004); MICHAEL
C. DORF, A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE, CORNELL LAW
FACULTY PUBLICATIONS (2002), available at http'//scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/116.

27. See generally Eskridge, A Pluralist Theory, supra note 25; Jurgen Habermas,
Multiculturalism and the Liberal State, 47 STAN. L. REV. 849, 851 (1995) ("Citizens share
a political culture shaped by a particular history. The constitutional principles are...
interpreted from the perspective of this political culture, which provides at the same time
the base for a constitutional patriotism."); Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The
Triumph of Pluralism,and Its Effects on Liberty, Equality, and Choice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV.
1105 (2003).
28. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Reflecting concern for the
immense power wielded by the Court as the final arbiter of the law, the theory of judicial
review imposes limits on the interpretive powers of the Court, especially its ability as an
unelected branch of government to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. See id. at 177
(giving judges the power to say "what the law is"); see alsoMitchell Berman, Constitutional
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tion.29 These four constructs operate collectively to inform the Court's
consideration of equal protection issues and shape the contours of the
These constructs can be
Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
a conceptual tool for
either
as
function
organized according to their
0
(the mediating
Clause"
Protection
Equal
discerning the meaning of the

Interpretation: Non-originalism, 6 PHIL. COMPASS 408 (2011).

This has often been

described in the literature as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." POST, supra note 25,

at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). The term "counter-majoritarian difficulty" was
coined by Alexander Bickel. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2000); see also J. M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1018 (1998)
(describing these methodological constructs as "legal process theories,"which were designed
to limit federal judicial power to accommodate both federalism and separation of power
concerns).
John Hart Ely famously defended the seemingly activist decisions of the Warren Court,
particularly those pertaining to the protection of minority rights under the Equal
Protection Clause, as reflective of a representation-reinforcement theory ofjudicial review.
John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-ReinforcingMode of JudicialReview, 37 MD. L.
REV. 451, 453 (1978) [hereinafter Ely, JudicialReview] (defending the Warren Court and
its decisions that inspired Ely's representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review as
"fueled not by a desire on the part of the Court to vindicate particular substantive values
it had determined were important or fundamental, but rather by a desire to ensure that
the political process... was open to those of all viewpoints on an equal basis" (footnote
omitted)); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

REvIEW (1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST]. Bickel, Ely's mentor, offered
an alternative theory of judicial review that sought to avoid the exercise of judicial review
altogether by finding matters non-justiciable. See Berman, supra, at 409.
29. See POST, supranote 25, at 14-15 (describing methods of constitutional interpretation as a way to limit the power of judicial review by serving as an intermediary between
the Justices and the text). In addition to the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1, there are many "open-textured" provisions of the Constitution that require some
limiting principle to guide the Court's search for meaning. POST, supra note 25, at 14
("[The question of constitutional meaning cannot be resolved by staring harder at the ten
words of the clause. What is required instead is a means of interpreting the text so as to
mediate between the clause and its application.") Although methods of constitutional
interpretation are wide-ranging, most fall into one of two categories-originalist and nonoriginalist. See Berman, supra note 28, at 408; Id; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting
Beyond Formalism in ConstitutionalLaw: ConstitutionalTheory Matters, 54 OELA. L. REV.
1 (2001).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The entire text of the Equal Protection Clause
provides as follows: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id. Scholars agree this text is subject to no fixed, ascertainable
meaning. See, e.g., ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 28, at 31 (noting with

respect to the Equal Protection Clause that "[t]he constitutional text doesn't give us a clue
as to what [the standards] might be, and we are left with a provision whose general
concern-equality-is clear enough but whose content beyond that cannot be derived from
anything within its four corners or the known intentions of its framers"); see also ANDREW
KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992); Fiss, supra note 25.
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principles and the theory of democracy) or as a methodological tool
limiting the interpretive power of the judiciary (the method of constitutional interpretation and the theory of judicial review).31 This Article
will address the meaning and import of each of these constructs
individually, as well as their collective operation to create the robust
analytical framework within which the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence is developed and from which the diversity rationale has
rightly emerged.
This Article is divided into five parts. Parts II and III address the
interpretive constructs that aid the Court in assigning meaning to our
Equal Protection Clause. Parts IV and V address the limiting constructs
that restrain the exercise of the Court's interpretive power over the
Equal Protection Clause. Part II addresses the mediating principle as
the primary interpretive construct for divining the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause and the locus of the scholarly debate concerning the
legitimacy of the diversity rationale. Contrary to the popular debate
that frames this issue as one of either formal antidiscrimination or
substantive antisubordination, Part II reveals that the Court's equal
protection doctrine actually reflects an evolution of the animating
principle from formal antisubordination to substantive antidiscrimination. Notwithstanding the competing scholarly claims that the diversity
rationale negates the aspirational antidiscrimination principle of formal
colorblindness or that it abandons the substantive equality aims of
antisubordination, the diversity rationale does neither. Rather, the
diversity rationale represents a principle of substantive antidiscrimination that attends to the present realities of inequality through substantive race-consciousness while also vindicating an aspirational equality
ideal.
Part III explores pluralism as the theory of democracy animating our
Constitution at large and its ostensible extension to the Equal Protection
Clause.32 Using pluralism as an interpretive lens for understanding

31. This dichotomy loosely correlates to Mitchell Berman's contention that constitutional adjudication consists of two distinct processes directed at either discerning constitutional
meaning (methodological) or crafting constitutional doctrines (conceptual). See Berman,
supra note 28, at 409-10 (distinguishing between methods of constitutional interpretation
and theories of judicial review as limiting constructs for constitutional decision-making,
noting in particular the latter's role in justifying the exercise of judicial power, especially
in negating the authority of the democratic branches of government).
32. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961) (describing the proper means of controlling factions in government as expanding
the number and variety of interests involved in government). This aim is equally
expressed in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, a fact noted by various scholars.
See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 27; James Weinstein, Democracy, Sex and the First
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and applying the Equal Protection Clause reveals why effective
participation in the American polity by the growing number and variety
of racial and ethnic minority groups is essential to legitimizing our
pluralist democratic ideals in the hearts and minds of America's
increasingly multi-racial and multi-ethnic citizenry. The diversity
rationale embraced by the Court in Grutter reflects this multicultural
strand of democratic pluralism.3 Notwithstanding Grutter's attention
to the educational context, Part III will also discuss judicial appointments as a natural extension of the Court's diversity rationale in
Grutter.

Amendment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 865 (2007).
33. This Article focuses on the importance of the diversity rationale the court adopted
in Grutter for racial and ethnic minorities, notwithstanding the fact that diversity and the
diversity rationale entail the consideration of other personal identity traits, such as gender,
religion, sexual orientation, disability, or socioeconomic status. See Hawkins, A
Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 20, at 82 & n.34 (discussing the multiple
primary and secondary dimensions of diversity). The reason for the exclusive focus on race
and ethnicity here is two-fold.
First, race is unique in our equal protection jurisprudence. Race and ethnicity are the
only categories subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection, the highest standard of
judicial review. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The strict
scrutiny standard makes efforts to achieve racial and ethnic diversity more vulnerable to
challenge than other diversity objectives. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995). Efforts to achieve gender diversity, for instance, would be subject only to
intermediate review under equal protection, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98
(1976), and efforts to achieve socioeconomic diversity would be subject only to rational basis
review under equal protection. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 55 (1973). Under either of these lower standards of review, diversity efforts are more
likely to be sustained. However, race-conscious efforts designed to achieve racial and
ethnic diversity are presumptively invalid. Adarand Constructors,Inc., 515 U.S. at 227.
This presumption can only be overcome by demonstrating that race is used to further some
compelling interest, and the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Id.
This heavy burden of proof for race-conscious diversity efforts makes them unique in our
equal protection jurisprudence and deserving of separate treatment.
Second, notwithstanding the fact that gender is consciously considered in the admissions
practices of many colleges and universities for the purpose of achieving gender diversity,
such gender-conscious diversity practices have never been challenged by any applicant, nor
considered by any court. See, e.g., Debra Franzese, The Gender Curve: An Analysis of
Colleges' Use of Affirmative Action Policies to Benefit Male Applicants, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
719 (2007); but cf United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (striking down the
admissions policy of the Virginia Military Institute, which excluded females from admission
due to a presumption of unfitness for the duties of a "citizen soldier," not to achieve
diversity, after the male-only admissions policy was challenged by a female applicant);
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (challenging a workplace affirmative action
plan favoring women adopted as a remedy for past discrimination against women by skilled
trade unions).
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Part IV undertakes an analysis of the theory of judicial review as a
limiting principle for the Equal Protection Clause. According to John
Hart Ely's famous representation-reinforcement theory ofjudicial review,
the Court's judicial authority as exercised pursuant to the Equal
Protection Clause is limited to the following: (1) preventing entrenchment of political power by broadening access to the political process, or
(2) protecting minority rights by correcting discrimination in the political
process.34 Part IV demonstrates how the Court's embrace of the
diversity rationale represents a proper exercise of judicial review to
prevent the entrenchment of political power by a white majority to the
exclusion of a growing number of multi-racial and multi-ethnic
35
citizens.
Finally, Part V considers the method of constitutional interpretation
as a limit on the Court's interpretative authority. In particular, Part V
will explore contextualism, which seeks to construct constitutional
meaning with a view toward reconciling it to the socio-political context
in which individual cases are decided. 36 Contextualism provides a
descriptive explanation of the Court's prior equal protection jurisprudence as much as it offers a normative defense of the diversity rationale.
After establishing the importance of this contextualist approach to the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence, Part V surveys the twenty-first
century context in which the diversity rationale has emerged. It
concludes with a defense of the Court's diversity rationale in the context
of a larger legal discourse on democratic legitimacy and a broader social
narrative on identity politics in our post-modern, multi-cultural society.
II.

THE MEDIATING PRINCIPLE: AN EVOLVING PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL
PROTECTION

Owen Fiss originally described an extra-textual reference or "mediating principle" needed to discern the otherwise oblique meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause. 37 Fiss famously offered two competing
principles of construction for the Equal Protection Clause - antisubordi-

34. Ely, JudicialReview, supra note 28, at 452-54.
35. See discussion infra Part IV.B. The diversity rationale would equally accommodate
a view of increasing access to political power by women, but that is not the focus of this
paper. See discussion supra note 33. The Supreme Court has consistently treated race
separately from gender in its equal protection analysis, so this Article will also treat the

two separately, although there is no reason to believe that any of the analysis contained
in this paper would not be equally applicable to claims of gender diversity.
36. See infra Part V.

37. Fiss, supra note 25, at 107-08.

20151

THE REALITY OF OUR INEQUALITY

3
nation" and antidiscrimination. " These two principles have long
dominated the literature both descriptively, in explaining the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence, and normatively, in structuring the
40
debate about the substantive content of the Equal Protection Clause.
A survey of the Court's equal protection cases demonstrates that this
1
debate is not one of "either. .. or," but "both ... and." Over time, the
Court has embraced both of these principles in an effort to give meaning
2
to the Equal Protection Clause." Neither principle has exclusively
defined the Clause; rather, both have informed the Court's interpretation
and application of the equal protection guaranteed under the Constitution. 3
The seemingly irreconcilable nature of antisubordination and
antidiscrimination arises from the narrow scope of the debate. The
narrow inquiry animating that debate-namely whether the Equal
Protection Clause is, or should be, informed by a normative principle of
antisubordination and its presumptive corollary of substantive equality
or antidiscrimination and its presumptive corollary of formal equality-ignores the broader constitutional framework within which the Equal
Protection Clause must be understood and equal protection cases have
been decided. For instance, the failure to acknowledge the Court's

38. Id. at 147. Originally designated the "group-disadvantaging principle" by Fiss, he
later embraced it as the antisubordination principle. OWEN Fiss, ANOTHER EQUALITY,
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, at 5 (2004), availableat http://www.law.yale.edu/document
s/pdf/Faculty/FissAnotherEquality.pdf.

39. See Fiss, supra note 25, at 108-18. The antidiscrimination principle has also been
referred to as the anticlassification or antidifferentiation principle. See infra note 40.
40. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Foreward:In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,90
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1976); Ruth Colker, Anti-SubordinationAbove All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986); John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative
Action, and the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal
Prohibitionof Discrimination,71 FORDHAM L. REV. 423 (2002); Siegel, supra note 26.
New normative principles have begun to emerge in the literature. See, e.g., Eskridge, A
PluralistTheory, supra note 25 (describing a pluralist theory of equal protection); Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 776 (2011) (describing a
"liberty-based" equal protection theory); Bertrall L. Ross II, The Representative Equality
Principle:Disaggregatingthe Equal ProtectionIntent Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175
(2012) (describing a representative equality principle); see also Charles Lawrence, The
Epidemiology of Color-Blindness:Learning to Think and Talk About Race, Again, 15 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1995); Mario Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future
Equal Protection Doctrine?,43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2011).
41. See Jack Balkin, Plessy, Brown & Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1689,1711 (2005) (noting that the antidiscrimination and antisubordination principles
all appear in our constitutional equal protection doctrine at different times).

42. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
43. Id.
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contextualist method of constitutional interpretation in deciding equal
protection cases obscures the shifting context that is central to the
Court's interpretation and application of the Equal Protection Clause.
This contextualist method of constitutional interpretation has generated
an evolving approach to equal protection that has given rise to a
dynamic construction of the Clause, one that neither understands the
Equal Protection Clause as limited to a single mediating principle, nor
has restrained its meaning in vindicating either principle."
The
interplay of the Court's contextualist method of construction with the
mediating principles is evident in the attention given to the sociopolitical context in selecting among the mediating principles of
construction.4 5
A.

FormalAntisubordination
The Thirty-Ninth Congress drafted the Equal Protection Clause in the
wake of the Civil War as part of the Reconstruction Amendments."
These Reconstruction Amendments secured protection from re-enslavement for the newly freed slaves,47 offered a guarantee to all citizens of
equal protection under the law,4 and granted black men the right to
vote.4 9 Early judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection construed its meaning in the context of the
broader remedial impetus of these Reconstruction Amendments and their
intended effect on the discrete group of black citizens, who prior to the
Civil War had been enslaved, disenfranchised, and at least according to
the then prevailing wisdom, were in possession of no legal rights that
the courts were bound to recognize or respect.50

44. Id. (arguing that the way we have interpreted equality has changed and has
reflected political compromise in light of prevailing social and political forces).
45. Id.
46. See Eric Foner, The OriginalIntent of the FourteenthAmendment: A Conversation
with Eric Foner, 6 NEV. L.J. 425, 427 (2005).
47. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII.
48. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment also contains the Privileges
and Immunities and Due Process Clauses, granting to persons born or naturalized in the
United States the rights and privileges of national citizenship and guaranteeing to those
persons due process of law, respectively. Id.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. Women, including black women, were not constitutionally
entitled to vote until passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. U.S. CONST. amend.
XDC
50. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05, 407(1857) (referring to black slaves as
a part of "that unfortunate race... altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either
in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white
man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to
slavery for his benefit").
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The Court's view of the meaning and import of the Equal Protection
Clause in these early decisions was substantially influenced by thatI
history. In fact, the Court's opinion in The Slaughter-House Cases,"
the very first case to consider a challenge under the Equal Protection
of the
Clause, was as much a lesson in this history as an adjudication
2
Justice
slaughterhouses.
challenged statute governing Louisiana
Miller, writing for the Court, observed that any reading of the Reconstruction Amendments must be "taken in connection with the history of
the times." 3 The times to which Justice Miller alluded were marked
most acutely by the institution of slavery, the battle over slavery fought
through the Civil War, and the guarantees of freedom and equality
secured for the former slaves through ratification of the Reconstruction
Amendments.54 In restricting the impact of the Clause to curing the
condition of slavery and its effects, the Court reasoned the Clause must
5
be read in light of its history and purpose.
6
In the 1880 case of Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court again
affirmed this history and purpose as central to its construction of the
Equal Protection Clause.5 7 Strauder claimed that as a black criminal
defendant he had been denied the equal protection of law58because West
Virginia excluded black men from service on his jury. The Court
viewed this exclusion as the precise historic wrong to which the
Amendment was directed, "namely, securing to a race recently emanci9
So
pated ... all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy."
convinced was the Court of the clarity and singularity of this purpose in
1880 that it observed, "We doubt very much whether any action of a

51. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).

52. See id. (denying the equal protection claims of the Louisiana butchers who were
challenging a rule prohibiting them from operating slaughterhouses in the city, and
reasoning that the Equal Protection Clause should be narrowly construed as inuring
exclusively to the benefit of the recently emancipated slaves).
53. Id. at 67; see also discussion infra Part V.
54. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 67-72. Ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment was made a condition of the Southern States' reentry into the Union following
the Civil War. See Foner, supra note 46, at 439.
55. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
56. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
57. Id. at 307.
58. Id. at 304. West Virginia had enacted a law in 1873, contemporaneous with the
ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, providing for jury service only by "white
male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of th[e] State." Id. at
305.
59. Id. at 306.
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State, not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes, as a
class, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision." °
Notwithstanding this strong conviction, the Court quickly expanded
the reach of the Equal Protection Clause to other racial and ethnic
minorities who were also suffering under the weight of discriminatory
1
laws and treatment at the hands of the white majority."
But the
purpose of securing to subordinated races, as a class, a formal equality
of "all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy" under the law
remained the guiding force of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence
during this era.
It is not difficult to understand why the Court was so readily able to
extrapolate from an Equal Protection Clause presumed to remedy the
mistreatment of blacks on the basis of their race a broad principle of
formal antisubordination that sought to rectify the de jure oppression of
racial and ethnic minorities whose fundamental rights to dignity and
equality were denied on the basis of their race. Although the dominant
American narrative of oppression is the story of African slavery, there
are equally compelling narratives of legalized oppression involving other
racial and ethnic minority groups, many of them contemporaneous with
the slavery and Jim Crow narratives emblematic of the black experience. 63

60. Id. at 307 (quoting The Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. at 81).
61. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (adjudicating the rights of
Chinese-Americans under the Equal Protection Clause).
62. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306. The Court did not abandon this class theory of equal
protection or reject the group-oriented rights and remedies claims that are characteristic
of the antisubordination principle until it adopted the formal antidiscrimination principle.
See infra Part II.C.
63. See generally JILL NORGREN & SERENA NANDA, AMERICAN CULTURAL PLURALISM

LAW (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the legal subordination of Native Americans, JapaneseAmericans, Arab-Americans, and Latinos, among others). Even as the Court in The
AND

Slaughter-House Cases construed the Thirteenth Amendment as expressly forbidding the
further enslavement of blacks, it also acknowledged the then-existing servitude of the

Mexicans and Chinese in America that could devolve into slavery, which the Court
predicted would equally be precluded by that Amendment. 83 U.S. at 72 ("Undoubtedly

while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth
article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the
Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within

our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void."). Around the same
time abolitionists were urging an end to slavery, Native Americans were suffering under
oppressive laws and practices designed to subvert their interests to those of the white
majority. See NORGREN & NANDA, supra, at 5-6.
The Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830), empowered the government to
relocate the Cherokee Indians from their native lands in the Southeastern United States

to land west of the Mississippi River, precipitating the historic "Trail of Tears." NORGREN
& NANDA, supra, at 7-8. In the 1840s and 1850s, dissatisfied with their inability to control
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For example, understanding acutely that the denial of citizenship
rights was not reserved solely for black slaves but would be meted out
against any non-white person or group (slave or free, black or other
racial minority), racial-determination cases were a common feature of
the nineteenth century, and were prosecuted against Chinese and
Mexican litigants as well as black "mulattoes."' It is clear, therefore,
that the de jure discrimination that occurred antecedent to the
thereafter,
ratification of the Equal Protection Clause, or immediately
5 Thus, it is easy
slaves.
and
was not reserved exclusively for blacks
to understand why in the years following ratification, the Equal
Protection Clause quickly transcended its presumptive function as
inuring solely to the benefit of the newly emancipated slaves to become
a broad panacea for the benefit of all racial and ethnic groups subordinated by law.6"
Throughout this period, however, the Court's contextualist construction of the Equal Protection Clause remained firmly wedded to a
principle of formal antisubordination, construing the guarantee of
equality as a safeguard only against laws that denied equal rights to
6
racial and ethnic minorities. "
the Native Americans, the government developed reservations, now commonly considered
a mark of Native American sovereignty, as a means to contain and manage the so-called
"Indian Problem." Id. at 8-9.
Also during the Reconstruction Period, Chinese-Americans suffered discrimination
through measures designed to prevent their immigration to the United States and laws and
practices designed to subjugate those who did immigrate to the social and economic
interest of whites. Id. at 227. In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58
(1882), barred Chinese laborers from entering the Unites States for a period of ten years
and prohibited their naturalization as United States citizens; NORGEN & NANDA, supra at
227; see also Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74 (striking down a local San Francisco ordinance
used to deny Chinese laundries the right to operate their businesses in the same manner
as white laundries).
64. See generally Ariela Gross, LitigatingWhiteness: Trials of RacialDetermination in
the Nineteenth Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998).
65. It is also true that the Framers intended the Equal Protection Clause to be a broad
guarantee of equality notwithstanding the historic impetus of African slavery. See
discussion infra Part V.
66. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (subjecting evacuation order to strict scrutiny
because it discriminated against Japanese-Americans on account of their race); Yick Wo,
118 U.S. 356 (striking down a San Francisco ordinance regarding the licensing of launders
because of discrimination against Chinese-Americans).
67. After the case of United States v. Carolene ProductsCo., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), which
would
established that cases asserting economic rights under the Equal Protection Clause
be subject only to the most lenient and deferential standard of judicial review-the rational
id. at
basis test, these cases became increasingly rare and almost never successful. See
economic
of
basis
the
on
claims
protection
equal
restricting
to
addition
in
However,
153-54.
interests, the Court, in a now famous footnote, also defined those circumstances warranting
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Nevertheless, this formal antisubordination principle went only so far
in vindicating the right to "equal protection of the laws" on behalf of its
presumptive beneficiaries-racial and ethnic minorities. The limits of
5 the
this principle are most evident in Plessy v. Ferguson,"
case that
9
announced the principle of "separate but equal," which secured to
racial and ethnic minorities formal equality before the law, but
continued to permit the enforcement of a subordinate status otherwise.7"
Brown v. Board of Education7 represents the apex of this formal
antisubordination principle and is also the most iconic of the equal
protection cases. Brown struck down the "separate but equal" principle
adopted in Plessy,"2 ordered the desegregation of the Nation's public
schools, and declared that "[s ]eparate educational facilities are inherent-

greater constitutional protection under the Equal Protection Clause, including "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities." Id. at 152 n.4.
It is only in modem times that the Court has been willing to expand the category of
persons uniquely protected under the Equal Protection Clause beyond racial and ethnic
minority groups to non-citizens (aliens) and women, but it has explicitly declined to extend
that heightened protection to persons on the basis of wealth, see San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist., 411 U.S. at 5-6, age, Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-16 (1976),
disability, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985), or sexual
orientation, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).

68. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

69. This famous phrase is found in Justice Harlan's dissent. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 551-52 (majority opinion). Homer Plessy, a man of mixed race, challenged
a Louisiana statute requiring separate carriages for black and white passengers on
intrastate railways. Id. at 540-42. The Court upheld the law, reasoning that the Equal
Protection Clause was designed to ensure the legal and political equality of the races, but
not social or de facto equality. Id. at 544, 552. In particular the Court reasoned,
When the government... has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before
the law and equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has accomplished the end for which it was organized .... If one race be inferior to the other
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same
plane.
Id. at 551-52. This treatment of equal protection as warranting only formal legal equality,
rather than substantive equality, was the hallmark of this period of formal antisubordination.

71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
72. See id. at 494-95. Notwithstanding the "separate but equal" principle adopted in
Plessy, which sanctioned "social" separation of the races, the Court continued to construe
the Equal Protection Clause consistent with this formal antisubordination principle by
intervening when the subordination of racial and ethnic minorities was given the force of
law or resulted in unequal treatment in the allocation of government resources, or both.
See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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ly unequal" because the separation of the races tends to "denot[e] the
inferiority of the negro group."
This recognition that the subordinate status of racial and ethnic
minority groups, when given the imprimatur of law, is properly remedied
under the guarantee of equal protection was the hallmark of the Court's
early equal protection jurisprudence, which focused on eliminating legal
distinctions based on race.74 It originated with the Court's first
construction of the Clause in The Slaughter-House Cases, and continued
75
through the Court's groundbreaking opinion in Brown. This formal
antisubordination principle was shaped by, and tailored to, the
forces
particular exigencies of that time and the important socio-political
76
influencing both the country and, by extension, the Court.
Substantive Antisubordination
Brown ushered in an era of unparalleled civil-rights activism and
success.7 7 Soon, it became clear that, if judged by the standard of
formal legal equality, the former de jure system of Jim Crow racial8
discrimination was being replaced by an equal-opportunity norm.
How well that formal equal opportunity norm would operate to ensure
the substantive equality goals of antisubordination by elevating the
status of blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities to the level of full
in the rights and benefits of citizenship was another matter
participants
79
altogether.
Buoyed by the lethal blow dealt to the de jure system of segregation
in Brown, civil-rights activists and leaders took up the cause of de facto
segregation and the total dismantling of the system of institutionalized
B.

73. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
74. See, e.g., id. at 483; The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36.
75. See generally sources cited supra note 74. Subsequent to the Brown decision, the
Court continued to strike down laws that segregated or subordinated on the basis of race.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
76. Although the Equal Protection Clause was originally enacted to address the
condition of the former slaves following emancipation, the Court's decision in Brown was
a direct response to international pressure surrounding the prosecution of World War
U-the United States was denouncing racial and ethnic persecution abroad but sanctioning
racial segregation at home. See Lia Epperson, Civil Rights Remedies in HigherEducation:
JurisprudentialLimitationsand Lost Moments in Time (forthcoming).
77. See generally Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968);
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
78. See Siegel, supra note 26.
79. See Alan David Freeman, LegitimizingRacialDiscriminationThroughAntidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1050-51
(1978).
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racial subordination.' ° Although the Court thought it best to leave the
implementation of desegregating public schools to the states, it became
apparent that achieving the substantive antisubordination objective of
Brown would not be accomplished by mere fiat of legal desegregation."'
In response, the Court adapted the formal antisubordination mandate
of Brown to meet the exigencies of the historic social and political forces
conspiring to undermine the mandate's force and thwart the Court's
efforts to desegregate the nation's public schools. s2 The Court granted
to the lower courts broad remedial powers to effectuate the holdings of
Brown and its later decision in Green v. County School Board' because
the states were failing to achieve the substantive goal of desegregation."

80. See, e.g., Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 20, at 94-96
(describing efforts to desegregate after Brown). It is important to note that this subsequent
effort was necessary to accomplish the substantive goal of antisubordination because of the
limits of the formal antisubordination jurisprudence to disestablish the racialized hierarchy
of social, economic, and political oppression, notwithstanding the elimination of the dejure
system of discrimination. See id.
81. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I/), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (commanding that
school districts implement the desegregation decree of Brown "with all deliberate speed");
see also Siegel, supra note 26.
82. See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Green, the Court's frustration
with the dilatory and evasive tactics undertaken by the Southern states in particular in
an effort to frustrate the antisubordination objective of Brown was palpable. See id. at 43739. Addressing this frustration explicitly and directing itself to what the Court believed
to be the necessary solution to the problem at hand, the Court declared that "It] he time for
mere 'deliberate speed' has run out ....
The burden on a school board today is to come
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now" to establish unitary public schools. Id. at 438-39 (quoting Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In rejecting the adequacy of "freedom of choice" plans, the chief desegregation strategy
then employed by the Southern states, the Court suggested that a more affirmative
approach might be required to meet the antisubordination mandate of Brown. See id. at
440 n.5 (discussing the views of the Commission on Civil Rights, which rejected the
adequacy of freedom of choice plans without more affirmative action to accomplish
constitutionally mandated desegregation). After this implicit suggestion for affirmative
integration efforts proved ineffective in reducing the dilatory and evasive tactics of school
boards avoiding the desegregation mandate of Brown, the Court became more explicit in
its direction. See generally Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971).
In Swann, two years after Green, the Court again addressed the issue of school
desegregation. Id. at 5. This time the Court found it necessary to define the contours of
the desegregation mandate and the remedial authority of the courts more explicitly than
in its previous cases. Id. at 6.
83. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
84. See generally Swann, 402 U.S. 1.
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5
In Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education, the Court
expressly sanctioned the use of affirmative, race-conscious measures to
move public schools from segregated to unitary, measures that the Court
had not previously entertained under its formal antisubordination
7
jurisprudence." Nevertheless, the unique socio-political context," in
particular the obfuscatory action on the part of segregated southern
school districts, informed the Court's approval of these affirmative
9
remedies, including the use of racial demographics to set pupil ratios,
91
gerrymandered school districts," and mandatory busing.
With the broad remedial authority bestowed by Swann, district courts,
including those in the North," imposed a variety of affirmative, raceconscious remedial obligations on school districts in an effort to
effectuate the substantive desegregation mandate of Brown by giving
93
effect to the more affirmative integration mandate of Swann.

85.

402 U.S. 1 (1971).

86. See id. at 22 (outlining the "problem areas" of school desegregation). There was
some limited enforcement of integration prior to Swann, but it was neither as aggressive
nor as widespread as that enforced following Swann. See, e.g., Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629
(commanding the admittance of an African-American to the University of Texas law
school). Many of these measures have since been questioned as the Court has adopted an
antidiscrimination principle of equal protection. See discussion infra Part II.C; see also
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (rejecting a student-assignment plan that used racial
classifications as a tiebreaker).
87. According to at least one legal scholar, a primary consideration motivating the
Court's aggressive enforcement of desegregation in public schools during the 1960s and
1970s was the negative attention generated by our national civil-rights struggles in the
eyes of the international community, which were trained on America because of our
prominent involvement in the Vietnam War. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980)
(suggesting based on this historic claim that blacks would only secure rights when their
interest aligned with those of whites).
88. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 13.
89. Id. at 16; but see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747-48 (rejecting the use of
population demographics to set pupil ratios as unconstitutional racial balancing).
90. Swann, 402 U.S. at 27; but see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,657-58 (1993) (rejecting
race-based gerrymandering of voting districts).
91. Swann, 402 U.S. at 30-31; but see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-47 (1974)
(rejecting a multi-district remedy of busing across district lines to effectuate school
desegregation).
92. Places like Boston and Philadelphia were subject to desegregation decrees for many
years beginning in the 1970s and continuing in some cases until the 2000s. See generally
Kevin Brown, Equal ProtectionChallenges to the Use of Racial Classificationsto Promote
IntegratedPublic Elementary and Secondary Student Enrollments, 34 AKRON L. REV. 37
(2000).
93. See, e.g., Epperson, supra note 76 (discussing adjudicatory-remedies issues postBrown).
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These constitutionally sanctioned and judicially imposed affirmative,
race-conscious remedies resulted in an unprecedented era of integration
95
94
that involved not just school districts, but workplaces, union halls,
6
government contracts, and even the government itself.97 Just as in
the school desegregation cases, the Court's broad view of the remedies
warranted by the Equal Protection Clause in these other contexts was
influenced in large measure by an acknowledgment that the desegregative goals of the antisubordination principle could not be obtained
without affirmative-and in some cases aggressive-race-conscious relief
on behalf of blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities.98
The object and effect of the integration cases can be juxtaposed to that
of the desegregation cases in their substantive, as opposed to formal,
approach to equality. Rather than accept a formal measure of equality,

94. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). Paradiseinvolved the
integration of the Alabama Department of Public Safety, which had engaged in blatant
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to hire black state
troopers. Similar to the school districts in the school desegregation cases, the Alabama
Department of Public Safety engaged in a number of dilatory and evasive tactics to
frustrate a court order to integrate its workforce. Id. at 153-54, 156. After a twelve year
battle waged in the lower courts to enforce a desegregation mandate, the Supreme Court
ultimately sanctioned an affirmative one-for-one black-to-white promotion plan as the relief
necessary to accomplish the object of the remedy required under the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 185-86.
95. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (sanctioning a
race-conscious plan requiring reservation of half of union training positions for blacks to
remedy past discrimination in the skilled trades).
96. See, e.g., Exec. Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) (requiring government
contractors to make affirmative efforts to employ and subcontract business to minorities).
The Philadelphia Plan was one of the first formal efforts to comply with the Executive
Order. See VANESSA K. BURROWS & KARE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41866,
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE REQUIREMENTS ON FEDERAL CONTRACTORS 9 (2011),

available at httpJ/fas.org/sgp/crs/misd/R41866.pdf.
97. See, e.g., J. Edward Kellough, Affirmative Action in Government Employment, 523
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 117 (1992).
98. See, e.g., Paradise,480 U.S. at 185-86. Describing its reasoning for the affirmative
relief ordered in Paradise,the Court explained,
As early as 1972, the Department had been enjoined from engaging in any
promotional practices "for the purpose or with the effect of discriminating against
any employee ... on the ground of race or color." In 1979, the Department had
promised in a court-approved consent decree to develop and implement a
procedure without adverse impact by 1980. By 1983, such a procedure still had
not been established ....
Given the record of delay, we find it astonishing that
the Department should suggest that in 1983 the District Court was constitutionally required to settle for yet another promise that such a procedure would be
forthcoming "as soon as possible."
Id. at 172-73 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting NAACP v. Allen, 340 F.
Supp. 703, 706 (M.D. Ala. 1972)).
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defined by the dismantling of de jure segregation, the integration cases
endeavored to secure substantive equality for blacks and other subordinated groups.99 Where formal antisubordination-as seen in the
desegregation cases-was concerned only with removing legal barriers to
equality, substantive antisubordination-as seen in the integration
cases-targeted the practical barriers to achieving equality0 0
Brown, the paradigmatic antisubordination case, symbolized the
rejection of the legal principle of "separate but equal," but it was not
until Swann, decided under a substantive antisubordination principle,
that black children were actually granted the practical remedy of
attending integrated schools.' 1 And while it is true that the civilrights legislation passed during the formal antidiscrimination era, such
as Title VII,'0 2 mandated the desegregation of workplaces, it was not
until cases like United States v. Paradise,'° ' decided under substantive
antisubordination principles, that blacks were granted equal access to
jobs.

104

For all the dismantling of legal barriers effectuated by the Court's
formal antisubordination jurisprudence, its formalist approach to equal
protection did not allow the Court to fashion the practical, race-conscious
remedies necessary to provide substantive equality to subordinated
racial and ethnic minorities. It took the Court's acknowledgement that
a formal equality principle-"[s]eparate . .. [is] inherently unequal"' 5was inadequate to achieve substantive equality-a plan that "promises
realistically to work now"'0°-to shift from a jurisprudence of formal
antisubordination (desegregation) to a jurisprudence of substantive
antisubordination (integration).
C. FormalAntidiscrimination
As early as 1978, however, the Court began to circumscribe the reach
of the substantive antisubordination principle exemplified by Swann.
Continuing to highlight a contextualist approach, in Regents of the

99. See infra note 100.
100. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 31 (declaring that the efficacy of any remedial plan
must be adjudged by the extent to which it leads to full compliance with Brown); Green,
391 U.S. at 439 (demanding a plan that "promises realistically to work now").
101. See generally Swann, 402 U.S. 1; Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
102. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16,78 Stat. 241,253-66 (1964).
103. 480 U.S. 149 (1987); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
104. See Paradise,480 U.S. at 185-86.
105. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
106. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
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University of California v. Bakke,"' v the Court acknowledged that the
context of the case was unlike that of the prior desegregation and
integration cases. 05
Where Brown and its progeny involved school systems that had been
subject to de jure segregation, the University of California system, which
sought to utilize affirmative race-conscious remedies to integrate the
University of California at Davis Medical School, did not have the
requisite "history of discrimination" to justify its use of affirmative
integration efforts."09 Reasoning that the only discrimination subject
to remedy in Bakke was "societal discrimination," the Court declared this
interest insufficient to justify the affirmative, race-conscious remedies
previously sanctioned in Swann.'
Rather, a heavily divided plurality of the Court concluded that,
without predicate proof of de jure discrimination by the university,
sanctioning the challenged race-conscious admissions plan would simply
extend the remedial use of race too far.'
The Court's prior willingness to sanction affirmative, race-conscious remedies in response to de

107. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Allan Bakke, a white male applicant rejected by the
University of California at Davis Medical School, challenged the Medical School's
admissions policy that reserved 16 out of 100 seats in the entering class for underrepresented minority students. Bakke asserted that the admissions policy violated the
Equal Protection Clause by creating a racial set-aside in the admissions process. Id. at
274-76. In a plurality opinion, the Court struck down the Medical School's admissions
policy. Id. at 319-20.
108. Id. at 300.
109. See id. at 296 n.36.
110. Id. at 307, 319-20. The Court noted, "The school desegregation cases are
inapposite. Each involved remedies for clearly determined constitutional violations ....
Moreover, the scope of the remedies was not permitted to exceed the extent of the
violations .... Here, there was no judicial determination of constitutional violation as a
predicate for the formulation of a remedial classification." Id. at 300-01 (citations omitted).
111. See id. at 310. Specifically, it would "convert a remedy heretofore reserved for
violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could
grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination." Id. Bakke did not, however, become emblematic of the end of the integration era
because of the additional interests asserted in that case, namely student body diversity,
which generated a different plurality in favor of race-conscious admissions plans in the
context of higher education. See id. at 311-12. Justice Powell joined with the more liberal
Justices (including Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Marshall) to sanction the use
of race-conscious admissions in higher education when the goal is student body diversity.
Id. at 311. However, Justice Powell also joined with the more conservative Justices
(including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Burger, Stewart, and Stevens) to cast the
critical vote striking down the University of California system's use of race in the U.C.
Davis Medical School program based on its impermissible reservation of seats exclusively
for minority applicants and the resulting failure to allow minority and non-minority
applicants to compete equally for admission. Id. at 319-20.

2015]

THE REALITY OF OUR INEQUALITY

599

facto discrimination in the integration cases gave way to a contextspecific construction of equal protection-one further removed from the
contexts of slavery and Reconstruction that precipitated the Court's
remedial construction of the Equal Protection Clause-which allowed the
Court to restrict the scope of the antisubordination principle. This shift,
however, was gradual.
2
In the 1986 case of Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education," the
Court again considered the appropriate predicate for the government's
use of race-conscious remedies."' The Jackson Board of Education's
teacher-layoff policy had been instituted in 1972 to redress the
simmering racial tensions that arose during this period of integration
and provided for the maintenance of a minimum percentage of minority
teachers. 1
The Court, just as it had in Bakke, reasoned that in the absence of
proof of prior discriminatory conduct in the hiring of teachers by the
Jackson Board of Education, the use of the race-conscious lay off plan as
a remedy for mere "societal discrimination" violated the equal protection
rights of the non-minority teachers laid off under the plan."' The
Court explained, as it had in Bakke, that broad "societal discrimination"
remedies. 116
was "insufficient" to justify the use of these race-conscious
This contextual distinction between remedying de jure discrimination
and de facto discrimination allowed the Court to emphasize the Equal
Protection Clause's concern for non-minority rights where no strong

112. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
113. See generally id. There were cases considered and decided under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, but due to the differing legal standards governing Title VII cases,
which make proof of discriminatory impact a sufficient predicate for remedial action in
addition to proof of prior discriminatory conduct, those cases are inapposite. See, e.g.,
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).

114. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270-71. Specifically, the layoff policy provided, "In the event
that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers through layoff from
employment... at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid
off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff."
Id. at 270. The result of this policy was that, in 1976 and 1981, non-minority teachers with
greater seniority were laid off and minority teachers with less seniority were retained. Id.
at 272.
115. See id. at 276.
116. Id. The Court characterized the predicate of societal discrimination as "overexpansive," being "ageless in [its] reach into the past, and timeless in [its] ability to affect
the future." Id.

Adding a further impediment to the government's ability to remedy

discrimination (its own or society's), the Court additionally reasoned that even where the
appropriate remedial predicate of past discrimination existed, any affirmative raceconscious remedy must also be "narrowly tailored" to meet the interest in remedying past
discrimination. Id. at 280 & n.6.
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remedial predicate could substantiate the need for the types of aggressive relief previously sanctioned in Swann.
In Wygant, the Court further limited the scope of the antisubordination principle by requiring that, in addition to offering sufficient proof
of past discrimination by the remedying institution as a predicate for the
use of affirmative race-conscious relief, the remedy adopted must impose
the slightest burden possible on the interest of affected non-minorities." Where the Court was not dealing with evidence of pernicious,
class-based discrimination by a government actor against previously
subordinated racial and ethnic minorities, it was able to emphasize that
the Equal Protection Clause was also concerned with the protection of
the individual rights of non-minorities."' This shift from elevating the
subordinated status of racial and ethnic minorities through affirmative
race-conscious efforts to protecting the interests of non-minorities
marked the arrival of the formal antidiscrimination principle and
defined its central tenant. In subsequent cases, the Court continued to
narrow the scope of the substantive antisubordination principle while
expanding its embrace of this formal antidiscrimination principle." 9
The case of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 2 ' signifies the
Court's definitive shift from the substantive antisubordination principle
to the formal antidiscrimination principle and reflects the context that
made this shift possible.' 2 ' J.A. Croson Co. involved a Minority
Business Utilization Plan adopted by the Richmond City Council as a
means of expanding access by minority contractors to the lucrative city
contracts available for bid by local construction firms from which it
appeared these minority contractors had been excluded.'2 2 The plan
required prime contractors that were awarded city construction contracts
to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to one
or more "Minority Business Enterprises" (MBEs), defined to include
businesses owned and controlled by "[clitizens of the United States who
are" 12Blacks,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleu3
ts.

117. See id. at 283-84 (comparing hiring remedies to layoff remedies, reasoning that the
"diffuse burden" of hiring remedies was preferable to the layoff remedy, which imposes the
"entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular [non-minority] individuals").

118. See id.
119.
Croson
120.
121.

See generallyAdarand Constructors,Inc., 515 U.S. 200; City of Richmond v. J.A.
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
See generally id.

122. Id. at 477.
123. Id. at 476-78 (alteration in original). These designations, as set forth in this

legislation, include some now outdated and even offensive ethnic references. Their use
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Since the plan was adopted by a majority black city council, black
residents comprised 50% of the city's population, and there was no
discrete evidence of past discrimination by the city against black
contractors, let alone minority contractors of the other racial and ethnic
groups benefited by the plan, the Court declined to apply the antisubordination principle declaring there was no basis for engaging in remedial
action in that context. 24 Signaling its constitutional concern for
protecting the interests of non-minorities over the protection of racial
and ethnic minorities where the context failed to demonstrate proof of
past de jure discrimination and highlighting the achievement of some
equality by racial and ethnic minorities, at least as defined by their
representation on both the City Council and in the population, the Court
has become
articulated the aspirational ideal of colorblindness that
25
consonant with the formal antidiscrimination principle.
The Court concluded that "[classifications based on race carry a
danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial
settings, they may ...

lead to a politics of racial hostility."' 26

The

Court reasoned that the use of race outside of the remedial context was
in tension with an aspirational-equality principle of colorblindness
inherent in the Equal Protection Clause.127
The Court's embrace of the formal antidiscrimination principle came
full circle when it was adopted in a case involving public elementary and
secondary education, the same context in which the Court first
announced the substantive antisubordination principle in Swann.'"
In ParentsInvolved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No.
1,"2 the Court considered whether public schools that had never been
segregated by law, or that had achieved court-ordered unitary status but
had become re-segregated due to segregated residential patterns, could
nevertheless employ race-conscious school assignment plans to achieve

here is to reflect the actual content of this legislation and is not intended to endorse or
condone any ethnic denominations used therein.
124. Id. at 480, 495, 500.
125. Id. at 500-01.
126. Id. at 493. The representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review was also
in operation here when the Court reasoned that it need not exercise its power of judicial
review to protect minority rights where blacks were in the political majority. Id. at 495-96.
127. See id. at 500-01. "The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race
is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting
preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs." Id. at 505-06. This
is a stark contrast to the clear remedial principle of equal protection recognized in
Strauder. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
128. See generally Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
129. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).

602

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

the integration that had been the hallmark and presumptive mandate
of the Court's substantive antisubordination jurisprudence.130
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained that an
antisubordination principle could not sustain the race-conscious schoolassignment plan because once any identified discrimination had been
remedied, no predicate proof of past discrimination could be offered;
therefore, race-conscious assignments "must be justified on some other
basis."'31 He distinguished between the de jure segregation, amenable
to a race-conscious remedy under an antisubordination principle, and de
facto segregation, which he described as "racial imbalance caused by
other factors."'3 2 He reasoned that the latter would be subject to
consideration under the aspirational antidiscrimination principle that
the Court recognized in Wygant and affirmed in J.A. Croson Co.'33 He
explained that the formal antidiscrimination principle required
colorblindness because, absent a remedial use of race, "[tihe way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis
of race." 3 4 Importantly, and notwithstanding this embrace of the
formal antidiscrimination principle and its command of colorblindness,
the Court did continue to recognize that equal protection might
sometimes warrant race-conscious action'35 and even held open the
possibility that those circumstances might not be limited to remedying
past discrimination, as under a substantive antisubordination princi36
ple.

1

130. Id. at 711; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 31 (declaring that the desegregation
mandate of Brown required a remedy that "promises realistically to work [to integrate
schools] and... to work now" (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 439)).
131. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 720-21. The discrimination referenced here was not
just the de jure discrimination of Brown, but also the de facto discrimination to which the
Court directed its remedial power under a principle of substantive antisubordination in
Swann. See id.
132. Id. at 736.
133. See id. at 741-42.
134. Id. at 747-48. Justice Kennedy did not join this part of the opinion, but he has
somewhat embraced the race-neutrality of the formal antidiscrimination principle in this
and other cases. See id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Grutter,539 U.S. at 378
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens." (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
135. Adarand Constructors,Inc., 515 U.S. at 237 ("When race-based action is necessary
to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it
satisfies the narrow tailoring test this Court has set out in previous cases.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
136. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("[We have never held that the only governmental
use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination.").
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D. Substantive Antidiscrimination:The Diversity Rationale
Having left the door open for some continued use of race-consciousness
either to remedy identified past discrimination or for some other as yet
unidentified reason, the Court in 2003 took up Grutter v. Bollinger, a
case that would signal yet another shift in its equal protection jurisprudence. With its stated mission to educate and train future state leaders,
the University of Michigan Law School (the Law School) instituted a
race-conscious admissions policy in 1992 that successfully sought to
increase the percentage of racial and ethnic minority students attending
that had been
the Law School, with some attention to those populations
137
body.
student
historically under-represented among its
The policy was challenged in 1997 by Barbara Grutter, a white female
applicant denied admission to the Law School, who claimed the raceconscious admissions policy violated her right to equal protection of the
laws.13 ' Attempting to capitalize on the shift in the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence away from the race-conscious substantive
antisubordination principle and towards a colorblind formal antidiscrimination principle, Grutter argued that remedying discrete institutional
discrimination 3 ' was the only interest capable of justifying raceconsciousness. She argued that in the absence140of such a predicate, a
required.
colorblind, race-neutral standard was

137. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 318-20; see also Brief for Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S.
included
306 (No. 02-241), 2003 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 157, at 10-12. These populations
539
Grutter,
See
particular.
in
students
American
Native
and
Hispanic,
African-American,
U.S. at 316.
138. Grutter,539 U.S. at 316-17. Notwithstanding the school's attention to increasing
the Court
all types of diversity within the student body, Grutter challenged, and
diversity
ethnic
and
racial
pursue
consciously
to
ability
School's
considered, only the Law
text
among the student body. Id. at 311; see discussion supra note 33 and accompanying
on
policies
admissions
diversity-driven
to
posed
been
has
(noting that no legal challenge
the basis of the consideration of any other diversity-related personal trait, including
gender).
to Grutter,
For instance, in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), the companion case
undergraduate
race-conscious
Michigan's
of
Jennifer Gratz challenged the University
See id.
admissions policy as a violation of her right to equal protection as a white woman.
and
college
in
gender
of
consideration
at 250-51. It is curious that despite widespread
diversity
university admissions to increase the presence of males and improve gender
of the raceamong the student body, Gratz challenged her rejection only on the basis
note 33.
supra
Franzese,
See
gender-consciousness.
its
not
policy,
the
of
consciousness
constitutionally
a
as
status
denied
139. This is in contrast to the societal discrimination
compelling interest in JA. Croson Co. See 488 U.S. at 505-06.
140. Grutter,539 U.S. at 317.
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In defending the race-conscious admissions policy, however, the Law
School did not assert that the policy was a remedy for past discrimination. Rather, the Law School argued that its interest in achieving a
diverse student body justified the race-conscious policy."" The Law
School asserted, among other things, that without consideration of race
in admissions the representation of racial and ethnic minorities would
drop precipitously among the student body and the pathway to civic
leadership within the state would remain closed to an increasingly large
segment of the state's multi-racial and multi-ethnic population.142
Such a result would, according to the Law School, threaten not only its
mission to train a diverse set of future leaders, but undermine the
functions of government more generally if leadership failed to adequately
reflect the diversity of the state's population.4
Against the backdrop of its evolving, contextualist interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court undertook to decide whether this
diversity rationale could justify the use of race-conscious admissions in
higher education.' 4" Notwithstanding Grutter's observation that "it
would be an extraordinary departure from modern equal protection
analysis to recognize an interest in diversity as a compelling interest"
given the prevailing formal antidiscrimination principle, 4" that is
exactly what the Court did.
The Court, led by Justice O'Connor, agreed with the Law School that
diversity is a constitutionally compelling interest for public institutions
of higher education. 4 6 She explained,

141. Id. at 319-20; see also Brief for Respondents, supra note 137, at 13. This interest
in student body diversity had been recognized by Justice Powell as constitutionally
compelling in Bakke, but he was not joined by any other Justice in this conclusion. See 438
U.S. at 314-15.
142. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 137, at 53. The Law School also asserted
that student body diversity was necessary for providing the most intellectually stimulating
learning environment. See id. at 46-56. Various amici filed briefs arguing for other
benefits of student body diversity, including better preparation for a global workforce, see,
e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in support of Respondents,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 181; Brief of General
Motors Co. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02241), 2003 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 200, and ensuring effective military operations. See
Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Grutter,539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 532.
143. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 137, at 53.
144. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322.
145. See Brief for the Petitioner, Grutter,539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 65, at 31.
146. Grutter,539 U.S. at 343-44. The Court adopted Justice Powell's reasoning from
Bakke regarding the benefit of improved classroom learning to be derived from studentbody diversity. Id. at 343. Justice O'Connor's decision to sanction the race-conscious
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[Tihe diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals
regardless of race or ethnicity ....[E]nsuring that public institutions
are open and available to all segments of American society, including
people of all races and ethnicities, represents a paramount government
objective .... Effective participation by members of all racial and

is essential if the dream of
ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation
47
realized.'
be
to
is
one Nation, indivisible,
The diversity rationale asserted by the Law School, and approved by
the Court, did not reflect a remedial principle of antisubordination, but
neither was it a command of colorblind formal equality as demanded by
the prevailing formal antidiscrimination principle. Rather, the diversity
rationale was an expression of the aspirational goal of ensuring the
present diversity of the student body for the future diversity of the
state's leadership.14 The diversity rationale's permissive use of race
was an acknowledgment that a formal, colorblind principle was
inadequate to achieve this aspirational goal.
Instead, recognizing that "[nlot every decision influenced by race is
equally objectionable," the Court upheld the Law School's race-conscious
4 9 Addressing the
admissions policy to achieve student body diversity.
colorblind mandate of the formal antidiscrimination principle directly,
the Court conceded that race-neutrality simply could not accomplish the
50 Not only did
goal of assembling a sufficiently diverse student body.
the Court disavow colorblindness as an adequate means of achieving the
Law School's legitimate, aspirational diversity ends, but the Court also
acknowledged that some attention to numbers was permissible."'
admissions plan was unexpected to some, given her prior decisions rejecting non-remedial
uses of race. See generally Adarand Constructors,Inc., 515 U.S. 200; J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469; Wygant, 476 U.S. 267. But given her opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc.,
which reserved the issue of whether future race-conscious action would pass constitutional
muster, her decision in Grutteris less surprising. See Adarand Constructors,Inc., 515 U.S.
at 237-38.
147. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331-32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. See id. at 316, 332. The Court additionally recognized improved classroom
learning and increased workforce preparation as benefits to be derived from student body
diversity. Id. at 330. I have previously discussed these other two benefits of diversity. See
Hawkins, A DeliberativeDefense of Diversity, supra note 20, at 105-06 (addressing three
compelling interests in Grutter,including a business case for student body diversity).
149. Grutter,539 U.S. at 327, 343-44. The Court determined that the policy satisfied
the demands of strict scrutiny. Id. at 328.
150. Id. at 340.
151. Id. at 335-36. The Court did expressly reject the use of racial quotas to achieve
even legitimate diversity ends. Id. at 334. However, it embraced the Law School's goal of
achieving a "critical mass" of racially and ethnically diverse students. Id. at 335-36.
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Thus, Grutterrepresents an embrace of a substantive view of equality
outside of a remedial context. This rejection of a colorblind approach to
equal protection is an acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the formal
antidiscrimination principle to achieve even an aspirational equality
ideal, which Justice O'Connor defined in Grutteras "[elffective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our
152
Nation."

Notwithstanding the clear historic moment to which the Equal
Protection Clause is directed as part of the Reconstruction Amendments,
from the very framing and ratification of the Clause it was intended to
transcend its remedial purpose and immediate context.153

Legal

scholars have defined this aspirational principle as antidiscrimination,
but have interpreted it as a command for formal colorblind raceneutrality. 154 The diversity rationale embraced in Grutter can be
reconciled with this aspirational principle of antidiscrimination, even in
its race-consciousness.
This substantive antidiscrimination principle, like any mediating
principle, does not merely justify the use of race; it seeks to define the
vision of "equal protection of the laws," and only permits or proscribes
the use of race in service to that vision. 55 Thus, it is important to
understand that not all of the justifications for student-body diversity

152. Id. at 332; see also Joy Milligan, Religion and Race: On Dualityand Entrenchment,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 393 (2012) (arguing that the Court's equal protection doctrine should not
adhere to a principle of formal neutrality, but should mirror the flexibility seen in the First
Amendment religious freedom and free exercise contexts to accommodate the need to
prevent the entrenchment of political power under a representation-reinforcement theory
of judicial review).
153. See KULL, supra note 30, at 88-89. The broad language of the Amendment, for
instance, is evidence of this aspirational intent. Early constructions of the Equal Protection
Clause also acknowledged this aspirational quality, while recognizing and vindicating the
immediate impetus and remedial purpose that animated its adoption. See, e.g., The
Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. at 72 (recognizing the Amendments could be expanded in
their application from the prohibition and remediation of black slavery to other types of
servitude).
However, as these events receded into history and the Court was successful in redressing
first de jure and then de facto discrimination, there arose a need to define the Clause's
dormant aspirational principle. Initial constructions of this principle were still very much
attuned to the remedial context in which the Clause had previously been interpreted and
applied. See Hawkins, A DeliberativeDefense ofDiversity,supra note 20, at 96, defining the
impetus of the formal antidiscrimination principle as remedial.
154. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critiqueof 'Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1991).
155. See Fiss, supranote 25. The vision, however, must be reconciled with and guided
by the theory of democracy animating our Constitution. See discussion infra Part fII.A.
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articulated in Grutter necessarily sustain a mediating principle of equal
protection.
The Law School offered, and the Court accepted as compelling, three
different justifications for student-body diversity: (1) improving
for the global
classroom learning; (2) adequately preparing students 156
Of these
legitimacy.
democratic
enhancing
(3)
and
workforce;
by
legitimacy
democratic
enhancing
in
interest
the
only
justifications,
institutional
an
than
more
as
serves
leadership
civic
to
path
the
opening
157
It also serves as
justification for a race-conscious admissions plan.
equal protection
aspirational
our
defining
principle
mediating
a broader
158
goals.
The goal of democratic legitimacy acknowledges that we aspire to be
a pluralist democracy and recognizes that so long as there is inadequate
representation of racial and ethnic minorities among our civic leaders,
our aspirational antidiscrimination principle of equal protection operates
'
in service to that goal. 59 The race-consciousness of the diversity
fully
rationale is a reminder that our equal protection jurisprudence is
160
principles.
protection
equal
substantive
our
able to accommodate
The antisubordination and antidiscrimination mediating principles
have guided the Court in giving meaning to the Equal Protection Clause
1
since its inception.16 Together they affirm that our Equal Protection
Clause was born of a particular historic moment, but it was not confined
to that moment. The mediating principles have identified our ends but
do not delineate the means by which we must achieve those ends.
Instead, they have served to remind us of the duty of "equal protection
of the laws."

156. Id. at 330, 332; see Hawkins, A DeliberativeDefense of Diversity, supra note 20,
in
at 105-06 (describing the three justifications offered to support the diversity rationale
case for
Grutter as (1) a functional benefit in improved classroom learning; (2) a business
improved cultural competence in a global world on behalf of major American businesses;
of good
and (3) a public interest in enhanced democratic legitimacy (also defined in terms
institutions)).
private
by
pursued
is
interest
diversity
the
when
corporate citizenship
157. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 332.
offered in
158. It is, perhaps, emphasis on the other more utilitarian justifications
job readiness,
support of student-body diversity, such as improved classroom learning and
protection
that cause those who support a substantive antisubordination principle of equal
note 19;
to dismiss the diversity rationale as illegitimate. See, e.g., James, supra
19.
note
Lawrence, supra note 19; Nunn, supra
a Rule of
159. See generally Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does A Diverse JudiciaryAttain
on the
Diversity
About
Say
to
Has
Law That is Inconclusive?: What Grutter v. Bollinger
(2004).
101
L.
&
RACE
J.
MICH
10
Bench,
160. See discussion infra Part III.A.
161. See discussion supra Part II.
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It is true that we have been inclined to a formal principle of equal
protection, but we have not been wedded to formality at the expense of
substantive equality. Our enduring goal has always been to give
expression to, and ultimately realize, that equality of persons that our
equal protection principles demand. When formal equality is inadequate
to the task of realizing our guarantee of equal protection, we have
embraced a substantive view of equality, knowing our principles demand
this of us. 162

The diversity rationale and its attendant principle of substantive
antidiscrimination are consonant with this tradition, recognizing that
both colorblindness and race-consciousness are always (and only)
permitted in service to the principles to which our equal protection
doctrine aspires. And when in service to these principles, race-consciousness will be permitted where colorblindness fails.
Just as the Court's embrace of a substantive antisubordination
principle of integration was a response to the failure of desegregation's
formal antisubordination principle to achieve our remedial equality
goals, so too is the diversity rationale's substantive antidiscrimination
principle now an acknowledgement of, and a response to, the failure of
the formal antidiscrimination principle to achieve our aspirational
equality goals. The structure of these principles and the relationship
between them can be understood as both complementary-remedial
versus aspirational-and continuous-formal then substantive-as
displayed in Table 1.
The antisubordination and antidiscrimination principles have found
expression in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence and will likely
continue to do so. They are complementary in this regard. The
relationship between formal equality and substantive equality is
progressive. The latter follows the former. Where formal equality ends,
substantive equality fills in the gap to fully realize the purpose that
defines the principle.
Table 1
Formal Equality

Substantive Equality

Antisubordination
(Desegration)
Antidiscrimination
(Colorblindness)

Antisubordination
Remedial Ends
(Integration)
Antidiscrimination
Aspirational Ends
(Diversity Pluralism)

162. See generally Paradise,480 U.S. 149; Swann, 402 U.S. 1.
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III. A PLURALIST THEORY OF DEMOCRACY: "BY THE PEOPLE"
This aspiration for democratic legitimacy achieved through "[effective
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life
of our Nation" is not just a principle that animates our Equal Protection
s
Clause, but also one that animates our Constitution more broadly."
Despite the emphasis in the literature on the mediating principles as the
defining feature of our equal protection doctrine, the mediating
principles are not the only interpretive tools that give meaning to the
Equal Protection Clause.'" The democratic ideals embodied in our
constitutional structure also have particular import when construing the
Equal Protection Clause.'6 5
Because the Constitution's primary function is to provide a structure
for the national government, it is important to understand the theory of
democracy that animates the Constitution. A theory of democracy that
both provides descriptive explanation for our constitutional structure, as
well as orders our normative analysis of constitutional questions, is
pluralism. 6" Pluralism was a central animating concern in structur6
ing our constitutional democracy. "
In this way, pluralism is more than a mediating principle for equal
protection, it is a democratic theory that informs our constitutionalrights discourse more broadly. 6 But its relevance to our constitutional guarantee of equal protection has been underappreciated in the
literature due to an emphasis on the mediating principles as the primary
interpretive tools for discerning the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause.'69 This oversight has isolated our analysis of the equal
protection doctrine from the broader questions of democratic legitimacy
that animate our constitutional discourse. Connecting our equal
protection analysis to this broader constitutional discourse and the
underlying concerns for democratic legitimacy animating that discourse
further reveals the wisdom and logic of the Court's most recent turn to

163. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 332.
164. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 26.
165. See Eskridge, A PluralistTheory, supra note 25, at 1249-51.
166. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralismand Distrust:How Courts Can
Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005)
[hereinafter Eskridge, Pluralismand Distrust].
167. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 32.
168. See generally Balkin, supra note 41, at 1706 n.54. This is especially true of the
First Amendment rights. See, e.g., id.; Viteritti, supra note 27.
169. See, e.g., Eskridge, A PluralistTheory, supra note 25.
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the substantive antidiscrimination principle of pluralism embodied in the
diversity rationale.
A.

PluralistDemocracy Defined

Chief among the concerns of our Founding Fathers in structuring our
democratic form of government was a fear that our democracy could be
dominated by factional interests.170 It was this concern that animated
the pluralist structure of our constitutional democracy.' 7 '
Deliberative democratic principles came to dominate our approach to,
and conception of, self-governance. The more participatory our politics,
the less fear we would have that factional interest groups could
dominate the public sphere and co-opt the political process. 2 The
object was to engage as many competing interest groups as possible in

170. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 32.
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none

deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control
the violence of faction ....
Complaints are everywhere heard from our ...
citizens... that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and
that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the
rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority ....

I. ..I
The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal
task of modem legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the
necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
...

...
Justice ought to hold the balance between them.
Id. at 129-32. "The genius of republican liberty seems to demand ... not only that all
power should be derived from the people, but that ... the trust should be placed not in a
few, but a number of hands." THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 2, at 268.
171. See generally sources cited supra note 170.
Distinguishing between a pure
democracy and our republican form of government marked by pluralist considerations,
Madison described the superior benefits of pluralist government as follows:
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first,
the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere
of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is... to refine and enlarge the public views

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens... which may
be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government ....
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 32, at 133-35.
172. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 32, at 134-35.
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the political process as a means of balancing power and guarding against
173
This engagement took
tyranny, whether of the many or the few.
many forms.
power1 7
Our constitutional democracy balances federal and state
1 75
and distributes power among three co-equal branches of government.
This concern for participation by a multiplicity of interest groups and the
creation of various alignments of interests among these groups in the
deliberative and political processes are reflective of our pluralist
ambitions. The resulting constitutional structures were designed to
17
facilitate robust democratic pluralism.
77
our constitutional democracy.
of
Pluralism is not just descriptive
As a theory, pluralism also animates our normative discourse about the
deliberative and political processes. 178 Pluralist theories of democracy

173. See id. Admittedly, preventing tyranny by the many against the few was a
precarious issue, especially with the tension this concern posed with the democratic
principle of majority rule. But issues of wealth and property ownership, as well as
concerns for the protection of religious minorities, ensured that protection of political
minorities was a paramount feature of our constitutional democracy. See Eskridge, A
Pluralist Theory, supra note 25, at 1244-45 ("[F]or these Framers, the most salient
'minorities' were creditors, property owners, and religious minorities."); see also Viteritti,
supra note 27, at 1165-68 (acknowledging Madison's concerns for minorities-religious and
otherwise-in fashioning a pluralist democratic process).
174. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 32, at 135 (describing the
division of power under the Constitution between the state and federal governments).
175. See U.S. CONST. art. I (describing the legislative branch); U.S. CONST. art. II
(describing the executive branch); U.S. CONST. art. III (describing the judicial branch); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)
(describing the separation of powers between the various branches of the federal
government).
176. See, e.g., Holning Lau, Identity Scripts & Democratic Deliberation,94 MINN. L.
REV. 897 (2010) (describing democracy-reinforcement theory, which stipulates that
constitutional rights ought to be interpreted in a manner that reinforces democracy, and
applying this theory in the context of equal protection rights).
177. See Joshua Cohen, Pluralism and Proceduralism,69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 598, 591
(1994). The descriptive claim is fairly uncontested. See, e.g., id. (acknowledging that the
claim of American constitutional design as pluralist is conceded and advanced by various
jurists and scholars such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, a Supreme Court Justice, Robert Dahl,
a political scientist, and John Hart Ely, a legal scholar); see also S. Sidney Ulmer,
Researching the Supreme Court in a DemocraticPluralistSystem: Some Thoughts on New
Directions, 1 LAW & POLY Q. 53, 54 (1979) ("[Tihe most popular theoretical explanation of
our political system is Democratic Pluralism.").
178. See generally Eskridge, A Pluralist Theory, supra note 25. For a general
discussion of the participatory and representative nature of our democratic government and
the constitutional jurisprudence directed to those interests, see generally ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST, supra note 28. In particular, Ely argued "The original Constitution's more
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generate no universal agreement,179 but they do offer a common theme:
the accommodation and engagement of multiple competing interests in
deliberative politics.s ° Therefore, pluralist democracy is undermined
or rendered ineffective when persons or groups are excluded from
effective participation in the deliberative process or their interests are
inadequately represented in the political process.181
It is no surprise, given pluralism's emphasis on the deliberative
aspects of our democracy, that the First Amendment" 2 provides a
frequent context for discussion of our pluralist democratic ambitions.8 3
For instance, political scientist Joseph Viteritti has explained how a
pluralist theory of democracy animates the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause,"8 necessitating the accommodation of religious choice
in the administration of school voucher programs."s
Legal scholar James Weinstein similarly offers a theory of democratic
pluralism grounded in principles of participatory democracy to defend
pornography as free speech."e The Equal Protection Clause similarly

pervasive strategy... can be loosely styled a strategy of pluralism, one of structuring the
government, and to a limited extent society generally, so that a variety of voices would be
guaranteed their say and no majority coalition could dominate." Id. at 80; see also Kevin
M. Fong, Comment, Cultural Pluralism, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 143 (1978)
(arguing that cultural pluralism is an important constitutional value expressed in both the
First and Fourteenth Amendments); Vicki C. Jackson, Multi-Valenced Constitutional
Interpretationand Constitutional Comparisons:An Essay in Honor of Mark Tushnet, 26
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 599, 611-13 (2008) (recognizing pluralism as a purposive interpretive
framework for the Constitution); seegenerally Eskridge, Pluralismand Distrust,supra note
166; Eskridge, A PluralisticTheory, supra note 25; V.F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The
Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955 (2009). Notably,
pluralism does not just find expression in our constitutional equality jurisprudence. See
Cohen, supra note 177. Pluralism, defined as participatory democracy, is a central
principle underlying our First Amendment jurisprudence as well. See id. (arguing that
democratic pluralism is essentially procedural in nature rather than substantive); see also
Eskridge, A PluralistTheory, supra note 25; Viteritti, supra note 27.
179. See Cohen, supranote 177, at 591-94 (discussing the various theories of pluralist
democracy advanced by Rawls, Dahi, and Ely).
180. See, e.g., Eskridge, A PluralistTheory, supra note 25.
181. See Cohen, supra note 177, at 602.
182. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
183. See, e.g., Viteritti, supranote 27; James Weinstein, Free Speech Values, Hardcore
Pornographyand the FirstAmendment: A Reply to ProfessorKoppelman, 31 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 911, 911, 914 (2007) (discussing the First Amendment right to free
speech as part of "participatory democracy," which he defines as an "equal opportunity"
right of constitutional value).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion].").
185. See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 27.
186. Weinstein, supra note 183.
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provides a suitable constitutional context for vindicating our pluralist
democratic ambitions. This is particularly true when you consider the
Equal Protection Clause as a means for facilitating minority participation in deliberative politics by preventing the entrenchment of majority
power, as articulated in Ely's representation-reinforcement theory of
judicial review."'
William Eskridge offers a pluralist theory of equal protection that is
useful for understanding how pluralism concerns animated the Court's
s
He
embrace of the diversity rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger."
describes our pluralist democratic ambitions as follows: "A pluralist
political system is one whose goal is the accommodation of the interests
of as many salient groups as possible ....

In a pluralist democracy,

social, economic, and ideological groups compete for the approval and
support [in the polity]."'"s

To determine which groups are "salient" and therefore deserving of
accommodation in the political process, Eskridge charts the political life
9
cycle of social groups moving from irrelevance to full participation. '
Eskridge's model of political salience is useful because it excludes
"irrelevant" groups from robust constitutional protection and identifies
those groups who can demand a constitutional right for full pluralist
participation in our democracy. 9' Eskridge places racial and ethnic
minorities in the category of full participation entitling them to claim a
robust constitutional right to effective participation in the political
92

process. 1

187. See discussion infra Part V. In promoting pluralist democratic principles, James
Madison equated the civil rights of minorities with religious freedom. See Viteritti, supra
note 27, at 1168.
188. See generally Eskridge, Pluralismand Distrust,supra note 166; see also Eskridge,
A PluralistTheory, supra note 25.

189. Eskridge, Pluralism and Distrust, supra note 166, at 1293.
190. Eskridge, A PluralistTheory, supra note 25, at 1250.
191. Id. at 1252. Even those groups who could claim no special constitutional
protection or accommodation could at the very least challenge political action that is
damaging to their interests under a rational basis standard of equal protection, which
although the least robust of the constitutional standards of review still provides some legal
cause of action for aggrieved persons, or under due process. See id. (noting that the
protections of due process apply equally to all citizens no matter their social-group status).
192. See id. at 1253-54, 1257 (tracing the transition of blacks from politically irrelevant
to marginal as early as the Reconstruction Period of the 1860s and then noting that the
Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s ushered racial minorities into full
participation).
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MinoritiesAs Political Interest Groups
This notion that racial and ethnic minorities are a socially cognizable
and politically salient group is not unique to Eskridge's theoretical
schema. Recognition of racial and ethnic minorities as politically salient
interest groups has a long and rooted tradition in our equal protection
jurisprudence.1 93 In the Court's voting-rights jurisprudence, for
instance, both the one-person-one-vote and vote-dilution cases acknowledge that racial and ethnic minorities represent salient political interest
groups worthy of recognition and accommodation in the political
process.194 Any claim that racial and ethnic minorities can no longer
assert a right to political recognition and accommodation in a "postracial" era, defined by a colorblind antidiscrimination principle, are
belied by the ongoing, and in many ways increasing, political salience of
race and ethnicity in modern politics. 195
The beginnings of the civil-rights and feminist movements in the
1950s marked the rise of identity politics that transformed the national
political landscape.' 9 6 Notwithstanding claims that President Obama's
election ushered in-if not reinforced-a "post-racial" America, politics
remain as racially polarized today as they ever have been.'9 7 Identity
politics also continue to define our electorate, which is increasingly
tracked, analyzed, and courted along social identity lines that include
race and ethnicity. 9 s Not only are racial and ethnic minority voters
B.

193. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); United Jewish Orgs. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124 (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
194. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, John HartEly and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329 (2005). This "politics of recognition" is not just

evident in our American system of democracy. One of the biggest challenges posed to

democracies both old and new is ensuring the effective accommodation of the political
interests of racial and ethnic minorities and their meaningful participation in the political
process. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Ethnic Identity and Democratic Institutions:A
Dynamic Perspective, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR
ACCOMMODATION? (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008).
195. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
196. See Eskridge, A Pluralist Theory, supra note 25, at 1257.

197. See PEw RESEARCH CTR.FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, PARTISAN POLARIZATION
SURGES IN BUSH, OBAMA YEARS (2012) [hereinafter PEW REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING
RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (2009).
198. See, e.g., DAVID A. BOSITIS, RESEGREGATION IN SOUTHERN POLITICS, JOINT CENTER
FOR POLITICAL AND ECON. STUDIES (2011); THOM FILE, THE DIVERSIFYING ELECTORATE-VOTING RATES By RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 2012 (AND OTHER RECENT
ELECTIONS) (2013); PEW REPORT, supra note 197. Various scholars have recognized that
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credited with carrying Barack Obama to victory in both the 2008 and
2012 elections, 99 but both the Republican and Democratic Parties have
to black and Hispanic voters to guarantee
conceded the need to appeal
2 °°
success.
electoral
future
Further, the notion of rights inhering in individuals rather than
2 1
groups, which underlies the formal antidiscrimination principle, is
inconsistent with both the fact of identity politics and the notion of
representative democracy.20 2 Even our Founding Fathers recognized
that20 3political power is wielded in factions, or groups, not by individuals.
Only groups of individuals who can assert a collective, cohesive, and
politically salient identity are able to occupy relevant space in the
polity.204 To the extent pluralist democracy demands that we accommodate all politically salient interest groups in the deliberative process,
racial and ethnic minorities have a strong constitutional claim for
20 5
political recognition and democratic engagement.

racial-and ethnic-minority identity remains politically salient even in our modem pluralist
democracy. See, e.g., Juirgen Habermas, Multiculturalismand the Liberal State, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 849 (1995); Deborah Ramirez, MulticulturalEmpowerment: It's Not JustBlack and
White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995).
199. See WILLIAM H. FREY, MINORITY TURNOUT DETERMINED THE 2012 ELECTION
(2013).
200. See RNC Launches the Growth and Opportunity Project Website: A One-Year
Check-Up, REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM. (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.gop.com/news/pressreleases/rnc-launches-the-growth-and-opportunity-prject-website; see also Juan Williams,
Democrats Making Hard Sell to Latino Voters, THE HILL (Sept. 6, 2012, 10:00 AM),
http://thehill.comopinion/columnists/juan-williams/247835-democrats-making-hard-sell-to"
latino-voters.
201. See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
202. See infra note 243.
203. See THE FEDERALIsT No. 10, supra note 32, at 133.
204. This conception of political power is reflected in the racial bloc voting cases, which
required that minorities asserting that they had been deprived of their right to equal
participation in the voting context prove the following three prerequisites to assert a
cognizable injury: (1) the existence of a geographically compact racial-minority population
numerous enough to constitute a majority in a given electoral district; (2) political
cohesiveness in the minority population; and (3) white voting patterns that ordinarily
defeated the minority's candidates of choice. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
50-51 (1986); see also Keith Aoki & Robert S. Chang, Half-Full, Half-Empty? Asian
American Electoral"Presence"in 2008,86 DENY. U. L. REV. 565,566 (2009) (acknowledging
that political power is "mediated through groups," notwithstanding exercise of individual
votes, addressing how Asian-Americans might better leverage their political power as a
group); Karlan, supra note 194.
205. See generally Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma ofMinorityRepresentation,
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1589 (2004).
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Even assuming we could achieve the remedial goals of equal protection, the substantive antidiscrimination principle embodied by the
diversity rationale identifies some aspirational value within the Equal
Protection Clause. 6 This aspiration is to achieve the Founders' vision
of a pluralist democracy, which in our modern context translates to
effectively incorporating the vast-and growing-groups of racial and
ethnic minorities who remain unrepresented or underrepresented in the
many institutions of government into the concept of "[wle the people."2 °7 This engagement must be both visible and meaningful.0 '
It was no coincidence that the presidential campaign of Barack Obama
inspired unprecedented engagement from so many quarters of society
that are often absent from engagement in the political arena.20 ' His
campaign galvanized racial- and ethnic-minority participation, particu-

206. It is not my contention that we have achieved the remedial goals of equal
protection. As noted, the pluralist theory of equal protection offered here as an expression
of a substantive antidiscrimination principle is in addition to, not in lieu of, any remedial
theory of equal protection expressed by the antisubordination principle. See supra note 33.
207. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. The groups that would be reflected in this pluralist view
of equal protection would undoubtedly include those to whom we accord protection under
the traditional remedial view of equal protection, namely blacks and other racial and ethnic
minorities, but would likely also include the growing number of "politically salient groups"
to whom Eskridge referred in his article A PluralistTheory of the Equal Protection Clause.
See Eskridge, A PluralistTheory, supra note 25, at 1252. Defining those groups to whom
we owe a duty under the Equal Protection Clause has never been easy, as evidenced by the
myriad cases applying something more than mere rational basis review, but less than strict
scrutiny, to claims under the Equal Protection Clause including gender, see Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976), national origin, see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), disability, see
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, and illegitimacy, see Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972). This uncertainty about the scope of the interest does not, however,
undermine the legitimacy of the interest, and there is no reason to believe that it cannot
be developed and expanded over time just as the remedial interest has been.
208. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 ("[Ilt is necessary that the path to [civic] leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity." (emphasis
added)). Both Justice Powell in Bakke and the Court in Grutter acknowledged that, in
pursuit of the diversity interest, something more than "token" representation was required.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (noting the university's need for a "critical mass" of diverse
students was necessary to accomplish its diversity end, which it could not otherwise
accomplish "with only token numbers of minority students"); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 (noting
"more than a token number of black students" was necessary to meet the interest in
diversity).
209. See Ellis, supra note 3 (noting that Obama generated unprecedented participation
from youth and African-American voters in the 2008 election). The percentage of black
voters participating in the presidential election surpassed white voters for the first time
in 2008. See, e.g., Rachel Weiner, Black Voters Turned Out at Higher Rates than White
Voters in 2012 and 2008, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2013), http-//www.washingtonpost.com/blo
gs/the-fiLuwp/2013/04/29/black-turnout-was-higher-than-white-turnout-in-2012-and-2008/.
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210 This was in no
larly among African-Americans, in record numbers.
211
small part due to his own race and ethnicity.
When groups see themselves and their interests visibly reflected in the
institutions and leadership of government, they become more vested in
the political process, 12 thereby giving credence to the notion of
representative government2 13 and furthering our pluralist aspirations.
This is the "legitimacy" defined in Grutter as necessary for the proper
214
functioning of our democracy.

C. Effective Participation:Democracy Outside the Ballot Box
Ensuring broad political participation by racial and ethnic groups
pursuant to a pluralist theory of democracy is not limited to participation in electoral politics. Much of the scholarship addressing a
normative theory of pluralist democracy, especially scholarship directed
to ensuring effective participation by racial and ethnic minorities, is
215 The normative value
focused on electoral participation and success.
of pluralist democracy, however, extends to other spheres of democratic
participation.
The diversity rationale the Court adopted in Grutter, for example,
takes an expansive view of pluralist democracy by identifying the goal
of expanding access to participation broadly in "the civic life of our
Nation."2 6 Although the particular context for Grutter was expanding
access to a public law school, this access was expressly recognized as a
means of ensuring "that the path to [civic] leadership [is] visibly open to

210.

See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 209.

211. See id. (questioning whether turnout will continue to rise without a black
candidate "at the top of the ticket"). Barack Obama is of mixed heritage. BARACK OBAMA,
DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE xv (Three Rivers Press
2004) (1995). His white mother was from Kansas, and his black father was from Kenya.

See id. at 9, 15. Barack Obama has self-identified as African-American. See id. at xii.
212. We know they were vested in the 2008 election because of the significance their
vote made in carrying Barack Obama to the presidency. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 3, at
1023 n.2 (defining the unprecedented participation from youth and African-American voters
in the Obama election as the hallmark of his election strategy).
213. This phenomenon has been observed most notably in recent history when
"minorities" have ascended to roles of visible prominence in civic life. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
214. 539 U.S. at 332-33; see Balkin, supranote 41, at 1720 (acknowledging that Grutter
makes legitimacy through representative democracy a key justification for diversity).
215. See, e.g., GUINIER, supranote 25; Eskridge, A PluralistTheory, supra note 25; see

also Judith Olans Brown & Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Nostalgia as Constitutional
Doctrine:LegalizingNorman Rockwell's America, 15 VT. L. REV. 49,62 (1990); see generally

Hayden, supra note 205.
216. See 539 U.S. at 331-32.
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talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."217
Thus, Justice Scalia's observation in his dissent in Grutter-that the
diversity rationale could transcend the context of higher education-is
correct.21 8 However, rather than representing a flaw of the diversity
rationale, as implied by Justice Scalia, this is its virtue. A pluralist
theory of democracy is concerned with engaging plural groups, including
racial and ethnic minorities, not just in the electoral process, but in all
of the deliberative aspects of our civic and political life.219 One aspect
of our civic life that has drawn a considerable amount of both popular
and scholarly attention for the ways in which it either succeeds or fails
in achieving legitimacy by reflecting the interests of racial and ethnic
minorities is the judiciary. 220 It is, therefore, instructive of the theory
of pluralist democracy to view the judicial appointments process from the
perspective of its engagement of racial and ethnic minority groups.
Looking at the federal judiciary as a microcosm of the judicial-appointments process more broadly demonstrates the extent
to which pluralism
221
concerns do and should animate this process.
The racial and ethnic composition of the federal judiciary lags
significantly behind the general population.222 Owing to the appointments of President Obama, our Supreme Court is now more reflective of
the racial and ethnic diversity of our nation than at any time in its
history, with one African-American 223 and one Hispanic Justice

217. Id. at 332.
218. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. See, e.g., Jeffrey Abramson, Analyzing the Zimmerman Verdict, N.Y. TIMES (July
15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/opinion/analyzing-the-zimmerman-verdict.html?_r=l& ("[T]he presence of even one minority juror changes for the better how the
jury as a whole deliberates... [and] has the democratic credentials to speak for the whole
community.").
220. See, e.g., CLARA TORRES-SPELLISCY ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE,
IMPROVING JUDICIAL DIVERSITY (2d ed. 2010); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judicial Diversity, 13
GREEN BAG 2D 45 (2009); Nancy Scherer, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is Universal
Legitimacy for the U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 587 (2011); Vargas,

supra note 159.
221. Looking only at the federal-judicial appointments process avoids the problem

posed by comparing the states where judges are elected rather than appointed.
222. See infra note 337 and accompanying text.
223. Justice Clarence Thomas was nominated by George H.W. Bush in 1991 to replace
retiring Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first Justice of color appointed to the Supreme
Court. See Maureen Dowd, The Supreme Court; Conservative Black Judge, Clarence
Thomas, Is Named To Marshall'sCourtSeat, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 1991), http/www.nytimes.com/1991/07/02/us/supreme-court-conservative-black-judge-clarence-thomas-named-

marshall-s-court.html. Justice Marshall was appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson
in 1967 and served until 1991. African Americans In the Law Collection, Thurgood
MarshallBibliography, UNIV. OF MD. FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.

2015]

THE REALITY OF OUR INEQUALITY

619

224 However, our lower federal courts
representing 22% of the Court.
225
are far less reflective of the racial and ethnic diversity of the nation.
Recent data shows that among the federal bench (including both the
United States District and Circuit Courts) less than 15% of judges are
2 26
racial and ethnic minorities.
By comparison, racial and ethnic minorities comprise 36.2% of the
227
The disparity between the racial and ethnic
general population.
bench and the racial and ethnic composition
federal
the
on
composition
the bench compromises the confidence
before
appear
of citizens who
citizens and, as a consequence, its
these
by
judiciary
reposed in the
228 According to Nancy Scherer, who has conducted empirilegitimacy.
cal research on the legitimacy of diversity as a consideration for judicial
appointments, this concern for legitimacy is echoed even among the
229
judges who serve on the federal bench.

umaryland.edu/marshall/researchguides/marshallbib.html

(last visited Nov. 7, 2014).

224. Justice Sonia Sotomayor was nominated by President Obama in 2009 following
for U.S.
the retirement of Justice David Souter. See Judge Sonia Sotomayor: Nominee
Supreme Court, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, http://www.civilrights.org/judiciary/sup
reme-court-nominees/sotomayor (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
225. See generally supra note 220.
226. See Ifill, supra note 220, at 46. Only 6.8% of judges are African-American, 5.3%
are Hispanic, and a pitiful 1.1% are Asian-American. Id. Shockingly, although gender is
only
not the focus of this Article, only 26% of federal circuit court judges are women and
Bar
American
Pacific
Asian
National
The
Id.
women.
are
judges
court
district
of
25%
of
appointment
and
nomination
the
for
Association has for several years actively lobbied
Move
to
Agree
Leaders
Senate
See
bench.
federal
the
to
lawyers
American
Pacific
Asian
Forwardon the ConfirmationofThree Asian Pacifw American JudicialNominees, NAPABA
(Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.napaba.org/napaba/showpage.asp?code=PR-senateprogress
031612.
227. See sources cited infra note 338.
228. This disparity is most acute in the criminal context, where defendants are
disproportionately black and Hispanic. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:

MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 96-97 (2010). As early as the Carter
in
Administration, there has been a deliberate effort to diversify the federal bench
See
recognition of the fact that the lack of diversity compromises judicial integrity.
to ensure
Scherer, supranote 220, at 588. President Clinton was acutely aware of the need
that his judicial and other appointments "look like America" to signify democratic
his
legitimacy with racial and ethnic minority voters, a key constituency throughout
CLINTON AND
national political career. Id. at 601; see also DEWAYNE WICKHAM, BILL
BLACK AMERICA (2002).
229. See Scherer, supra note 220, at 602 (noting that federal judges interviewed "stated
among
that increased diversity on the bench instills confidence in the system," especially
broader
the
of
components
"important
are
these
that
belief
the
expressed
and
minorities,
omitted)).
construct of political legitimacy" (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks
on the
serve
to
female
African-American
first
the
is
who
Rawlinson,
B.
Judge Johnnie
of this
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, offered a personal account
Africanof
conference
a
addressing
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of
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legitimizing function
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For a branch of government whose legitimacy depends on the public
confidence reposed in it,230 we should have grave concerns about the
ability of a growing number of multi-racial and multi-ethnic Americans
to view our judiciary as presently constituted as legitimate.2"' As a
result, not only does the diversity rationale support consideration of race
and ethnicity in college or law school admissions-as a pathway to the
type of civic leadership represented by judges-but also in the judicialappointment process itself where these leaders are selected.232
The diversity rationale embraced in Grutter seeks to further our
pluralist ideals not only by expanding access to higher education but
also by ensuring that racial and ethnic minorities effectively participate
in all aspects of the "civic life of our Nation."233 Although not always
explicit, we often see this pluralism principle in operation in the judicialappointment process and should encourage its continued use with
234
greater transparency.

American law professors, she remarked that she has personally witnessed how meaningful
it is to criminal defendants, many of whom are persons of color, to be sentenced by an
African-American judge. See Notes of Keynote Address by The Honorable Johnnie B.
Rawlinson, Lutie Lytle Writers Conference, UNLV Boyd School of Law (June 28, 2013) (on
file with author).
230. See Scherer, supra note 220, at 631-33.
231. It is also true that this demographic shift makes the canon of equal protection law
ripe for reconsideration, exposition, and determination. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note
28, at 996 (noting that the canons of legal theory are often challenged intergenerationally
for reasons including changes in demographics).
232. Recognizing that some judges are elected rather than appointed, concerns
regarding the diversity of elected judges are implicated by the work of scholars who have
addressed adequate representation of racial and ethnic minorities in the electoral process.
See supra note 198. The ability of the appointment process to enhance democratic
legitimacy by reflecting the racial and ethnic diversity of constituent populations, however,
is an additional argument favoring judicial appointments over judicial elections, which
have been challenged for other reasons. See, e.g., David Pozen, The Irony of Judicial
Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2008) (critiquing judicial elections for undermining not
only judicial independence, but also the democratic process more broadly).
233. 539 U.S. at 332.
234. See discussion infra note 276 (detailing the consideration of diversity in the
Supreme Court nomination processes for the four Justices who have been appointed to the
bench since the decision in Grutter). President Obama, in a recent interview, acknowledged his effort in trying to appoint judges to the federal bench who exemplify the diversity
of our nation as a means of legitimizing the bench for these citizens. See Jeffrey Toobin,
The ObamaBrief,THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2014), www.newyorker.com/magazine/201410/27/obama-brief (responding to an inquiry about the demographic diversity of his
appointments to the federal bench, reflecting nearly twice as many female and minority
appointments as his predecessor George W. Bush, President Obama defended these
appointments saying "there are some particular groups that historically have been
underrepresented... that represent a larger and larger portion of the population. And so
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IV.

THE REALITY OF OUR INEQUALITY
THE REPRESENTATION-REINFORCEMENT THEORY OF
REVIEW: CLEARING THE CHANNELS

JUDICIAL

Having addressed the two interpretive constructs that contribute to
the broader constitutional framework within which our equal protection
jurisprudence is developed, and by which the diversity rationale adopted
by the Court in Grutterv. Bollinger is legitimized, I turn now to the two
limiting constructs-the theory of judicial review and the method of
constitutional interpretation. The theory of judicial review is often5
defined in terms of legitimizing judicial veto of legislative action."
This construct is fundamentally about policing the mechanics of our
36
democracy and is procedural in nature.
Although rarely considered in the debate among scholars regarding the
choice between race-consciousness and colorblindness, which often
focuses intently on the distinction between the antisubordination and
antidiscrimination principles, one of the dominant theories of judicial
review, structuring both the Supreme Court's consideration of equal
protection challenges and legal scholars' analysis of those decisions, is
a
John Hart Ely's influential representation-reinforcement theory."
Borrowing from the reasoning of Justice Stone in the famous footnote
238
four of United States v. Carolene Products, Inc., Ely argued that the
legitimate-process function of the judiciary in reviewing the acts of the
political branches is two-fold: (1) preventing the entrenchment of
political power by "clearing the channels of political change;" and (2)
protecting minority rights by invalidating legislation motivated by
2 9 Ely argued, and
prejudice against a historically disfavored group.
others have subsequently agreed, that the Court's primary function
Equal Protection Clause is the protection of minority
under 24the
0
rights.

The representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review posits that
the exercise of the Court's power of judicial review over the actions of the
more democratically accountable executive and legislative branches is
properly limited when it operates to protect minority rights either by
broadening access to political participation or by redressing discrimina-

for them to be able to see folks in robes that look like them is going to be important.").
235. See, e.g., Ely, JudicialReview, supra note 28, at 451.
236. See id. at 452-53.
237. See generally id.
238. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
239. Ely, JudicialReview, supra note 28, at 453.
240. See id.; see also Karlan, supra note 194.
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tion in the legislative process."41 Inasmuch as the diversity rationale
is consonant with the aspirational value of substantive antidiscrimination and vindicates a pluralist theory of democracy, it is also legitimized
as an exercise of judicial power by its effect in broadening access to
political participation for racial and ethnic minorities. 24"
A.

Anti-Entrenchment Antidiscrimination

Much has been written about the means by which the representationreinforcement theory of judicial review does (and should) operate to
ensure meaningful access by racial and ethnic minorities to the electoral
process.2 3
Lani Guinier famously argued for various structural
alternatives to our winner-take-all majoritarian system to ensure equal
and meaningful participation by racial and ethnic minorities in
voting.24'
Indeed, the minority-protecting and channel-clearing
objectives of the representation-reinforcement theory were integral in
early voting-rights cases and served to open the electoral process to
racial and ethnic minorities during the era of the Court's substantive
antisubordination jurisprudence.2 5 But just as the Court's formal
antidiscrimination jurisprudence restricted the consideration of race in
contexts such as government contracting 246 and education,2 47 so too

241. Ely, JudicialReview, supra note 28, at 453.
242. Ely's representation-reinforcement theory generally maps nicely onto the debate

between antisubordination and antidiscrimination. Equal protection cases embracing the
antisubordination principle are legitimized as an exercise of the Court's representationreinforcement power insofar as they redress discrimination in the legislative process.
Equal protection cases embracing the antidiscrimination principle are legitimized as an
exercise of the Court's representation-reinforcement power insofar as they attend to the
aspirational ideal of equal opportunity.

243. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 25; Eskridge, Pluralismand Distrust, supra note
166.
244. See GUINIER, supra note 25, at 71. In particular, Guinier offers cumulative voting
and supermajority rule as solutions to the problem of minority-vote dilution under
traditional electoral processes. See id. Guinier's theories were considered radical,
notwithstanding their embodiment of a pluralist theory of democracy. Stephen L. Carter,
Foreword to GUINIER, supra note 25, at xi. Owing to her body of work advocating for
effective electoral participation on behalf of racial and ethnic minorities, when Guinier was
nominated to become Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, she was
labeled a "Quota Queen" by conservatives. Id. at vii, ix.
245. See supra note 193.
246.
247.

265.

See, e.g., Adarand Constructors,Inc., 515 U.S. 200; J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469.

See, e.g., ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701; Wygant, 476 U.S. 267; Bakke, 438 U.S.
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did the Court's formal antidiscrimination jurisprudence operate to curtail
248
racial considerations in the voting-rights context.
However, just as the formal antidiscrimination principle has proven
inadequate for ensuring effective participation by racial and ethnic
minorities in higher education, so too has it proven inadequate for
ensuring effective participation by racial and ethnic minorities in the
electoral and other deliberative political processes of our pluralist
democracy.2 49 It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the ways in
which the substantive antidiscrimination principle (as embodied by the
diversity rationale)-particularly its goal of legitimizing our democracy
through effective participation by racial and ethnic minorities-provides
a justification for the exercise of the Court's representation-reinforcement power of judicial review. To demonstrate the legitimacy of the
substantive antidiscrimination goal of effective participation by racial
and ethnic minorities in deliberative politics and the necessity of the
diversity rationale's race-conscious means of achieving this goal, it is
instructive to consider the alternative course.
Post-Post-Racial:The Dystopia of "Colorblind White Dominance"
In White By Law,25 ° Ian Haney Lopez predicts that if we were to
continue adherence to a formal antidiscrimination principle of equal
protection, race would continue to dominate our socio-political landscape,
and would transform from the present system of racial and ethnic
minority subordination by the white majority to a system of continued
dominance by a white minority over a majority "minority" population.25' Lopez calls this future dystopian reality "colorblind White
dominance."" 2 He envisions a state of intractable racial inequality
wherein the diversity of the population increases, but "Whites" continue
to dominate the social, political, and economic spheres of American
life.253 Lopez credits the formal antidiscrimination principle and its
B.

248. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Shaw, 509 U.S. 630.
249. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
250. IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (10th
Anniversary ed. 2006).
251. Id. at 143, 147-48.
252. Id. at 147-48.
253. Id. at 147-56. Lopez argues that the definition of who is considered "White" will
expand beyond the existing morphology-based construct of race to a construct of whiteness
that blends morphology with socio-economic status. Id. at 150-56. In this regard, not only
will persons of European ancestry continue to be defined as white, but so too may some
persons of Asian, Hispanic, and African ancestry (in descending order) if they also possess
the requisite socio-economic status to signify their class membership under this new and
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command of colorblindness for our ability to profess a commitment to
equality on the one hand while entrenching a racialized system of
inequality on the other.2' Although Lopez offers a dim prospect for
overcoming the inevitability of this system of American apartheid,2"
I am more hopeful. 2"
We have never evinced a rigid adherence to an equality jurisprudence
that fails to keep pace with changes in our socio-political context or fails
to fully vindicate our substantive equality ideals.257 To the contrary,
the Supreme Court has been highly amenable to doctrinal shifts in equal
protection that take into account meaningful shifts in our socio-political
context or recognize the failures of formal equality principles to achieve
substantive equality goals."'8 The doctrinal shift represented by the
diversity rationale is an acknowledgement that the prospect of colorblind
white dominance is consistent neither with substantive equality nor with
our aspirations for pluralist democracy. In an effort to fully vindicate
these constitutional ambitions, the Court has embraced a principle of
substantive antidiscrimination that recognizes the need to reconcile our
pluralist democratic ideals with the growing reality of colorblind white
dominance. This reality reveals the limits of a formal principle of
constitutional colorblindness.
C.

The Limits of ConstitutionalColorblindness
The theory of colorblind constitutionalism underlying the formal
antidiscrimination principle of equal protection posits that the raceconsciousness sanctioned during the Court's substantive antisubordination jurisprudence is inconsistent with a view of the Constitution as
colorblind.2" This claim is often attributed to Justice Harlan's dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson, where he argued forcefully against the maintenance of Louisiana's segregated railways, declaring:

expanded construct of "whiteness." Id. Lopez calls these newly inducted class members
"honorary Whites" in recognition of their acknowledged non-white morphological identity
coupled with their social status as white. Id. at 151.
254. Id. at 156-62; see also discussion infra Part V.
255. Lopez, supra note 250, at 162. Lopez opines in his closing remarks, "For the next
several decades, at least, we will suffer this racial future of colorblind White dominance."
Id. Marking time from the publication of his book in 2006, Lopez imagines a world in
which inequality reigns supreme until at least 2036. See id.
256. See discussion supra Part H.C; see also discussion infra Part V.D.
257. See discussion supra Part II.
258. See discussion infra Part V; see also Balkin, supra note 41.
259. See Gotanda, supra note 154.
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[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this

country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law.'
However, as with all of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, it
is necessary to view Justice Harlan's dissent in its proper socio-political
context to understand the nature of the colorblind claim asserted
there. 6 1 Plessy was decided in 1896, just thirty-one years after the
end of the Civil War, twenty-eight years after ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment and nineteen years after the end of the
Reconstruction Era. It was a time when the cases brought under the
Equal Protection Clause almost exclusively challenged state laws and
government action that "discriminated with gross injustice and hardship
against [blacks] as a class."282 Consequently, the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence was singularly focused on the immediate goal
emancipatof the Fourteenth Amendment of "securing to a race recently
26
ed ... all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy." 3
In short, Plessy was decided, and Harlan's dissent was authored, as
The
part of the Court's formal antisubordination jurisprudence. 2
object then was to protect blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities
from the racially subordinating actions of the white majority that the
law enforced.26 5 It cannot (and should not) be imported wholesale into
the Court's formal antidiscrimination jurisprudence in a manner that
distorts its meaning by ignoring this socio-political context. By
demanding colorblind constitutionalism in reliance on Plessy, modern
proponents of formal antidiscrimination fail to acknowledge the reigning
antisubordination principle of the era in which Plessy was decided.266
This inattention to context renders this argument both historically
inaccurate and logically flawed.267
Moreover, despite widespread support for colorblind constitutionalism
in theory, in practice we are more color-conscious today than at perhaps

260. 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Gotanda, supra note 154.
261. See discussion infra Part V.A.
262. Strauder,100 U.S. at 307.
263. Id. at 306.
264. See discussion supra Part II.A.
265. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307-08.
266. See generally Gotanda, supra note 154.
267. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 327 (acknowledging that"context matters" in adjudicating
claims under the Equal Protection Clause).
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any other time in our nation's history.26 Our acknowledgement of the
ongoing relevance of racial and ethnic identity to our individual and
collective consciousness is reflected in the myriad ways and countless
contexts in which we reinforce racial identity.26 s The government
collects and analyzes information on the racial identity
of citizens more
270
today than at any other time in our nation's history.
Recently, there have been a number of successful legislative efforts to
increase the amount of racial and ethnic data collected, analyzed, and
published by the government.27 1 There is also widespread public
accountability regarding the inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities in

268. See generally KULL, supranote 30 (arguing that despite rhetoric and dicta favoring
a colorblind rule, the Court has never actually adopted such a rule, but has repeatedly
declined to do so).
269. See discussion infra Part V.C.
270. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Revisions to the Standardsfor the Classification
ofFederalDataon Race and Ethnicity, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omW/fedreg-race.ethnicity (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). The government began extensively
collecting and using racial identity data in the 1960s, but did not create a standardized
format for coordinating the process among the various federal agencies until the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) issued Directive No. 15 in 1977. Id. Directive No. 15 was
revised for the first time in 1997. See Changes to the Standardsfor the Classificationof
FederalData on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 36874-01 (July 9, 1997).
The racial and ethnic categories adopted by OMB in 1997 were used in the 2000
decennial census, as well as adopted by various federal agencies for data collection and
analysis relating to not only the monitoring and enforcement of civil rights laws, but also
the development of policies and programs directed to the provision of public services,
including: the Department of Education (tracking student and faculty demographics),
Department of Labor Office of Government Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP)
(tracking employment demographics for federal government contractors), the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (tracking employment demographics for all private
employers employing more than 100 persons), the Office of Personnel Management
(tracking employment demographics for all federal employees), Small Business Administration (tracking minority-owned business enterprises), and the Department of Health and
Human Services (tracking health outcomes by demographic) among others.
271. See, e.g., The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong.
§ 3101 (2010) (providing for the collection of race and ethnicity data to study healthcare
disparities); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R.
4173, 111th Cong. § 342(a) (2009) (establishing an office of diversity in each federal agency
with oversight of the financial market).
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It was Justice Kennedy who remarked that
the private sector. 2
inasmuch as we might wish race did not matter, it still does.273
This national attention to color-consciousness is by no means limited
to counting, surveying, and tracking the overall racial and ethnic
demographics of various sectors of government, education, or business.
We also measure individual accomplishments by race and ethnicity, as
we celebrate the achievement of "firsts" or advocate for new milestones
in that regard.2 74

272. There are an ever-increasing number of surveys distributed and data published
on the racial and ethnic composition of colleges, see Campus Ethnic Diversity National
Universities,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://coleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.con/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/campus-ethnic-diversity (last visited Sept. 18,
2014) (ranking colleges and universities on their racial and ethnic composition in addition
to their academic rankings), employers, see Top 50 Companiesfor Diversity, DIVERSITYINc,
http://www.diversityinc.com/about-the-diversityinc-top-50/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2014)
(publishing corporate diversity rankings for 14 years); see also 100 Best Companiesto Work
for2011:Minorities,FORTUNE, http'//archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortunelbestcompanies/2011/minorities/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2014), and professional occupations. See Goal III
Report, ABA, http-/twww.americanbar.orgtgroups/women/resources/goaljii-reportcard.html
(last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (producing a report on the Racial and Ethnic composition of the
legal profession since the ABA's adoption of Goal IX in 1986). The American Medical
Association similarly tracks the racial and ethnic composition of the medical profession, see
Report on Racialand Ethnic Disparitiesin HealthCare,AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/member-groups-sections/minority-affairssection/news-resources/racialethnic-health-care-disparities/report-racial-ethnic.page? (last
visited Sept. 18, 2014), and even business vendors and contractors track racial and ethnic
minority status. See, e.g., Walmart'sSupplierDiversityProgram,WALMART, http'//corporate.walmart.com/suppliers/supplier-diversity/ (last visited Sept. 18,2014). Supplier-diversity
tracking and reporting is a significant part of the diversity-management practices of
corporations and other business enterprises. See id. In 2001, the Billion Dollar Roundtable was created to recognize and reward companies whose supplier diversity programs
reached the impressive milestone of generating $1,000,000,000 of spending exclusively with
See About the Billion Dollar
women-and minority-owned business enterprises.
Roundtable, BILLION DOLLAR ROUNDTABLE, http'//bdrusa.org/about-us.php (last visited
Sept. 18, 2014).
273. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
274. See supra notes 5, 7. We hailed President Obama as the first "African-American
president," see Ellis, supra note 3, at 1023, right after we celebrated his election as then
only the third black Senator to serve in the United States Congress since Reconstruction,
see Obama Wins Senate Race to Become 5th Black U.S. Senator in History, USA TODAY
(Nov. 3, 2004), http'//usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2004/2004-11-02il-ussenatex.htm. We celebrated Bobby Jindal as the first "Indian-American governor."
See Nossiter, supra note 7. We applauded President Obama for nominating Sonia
Sotomayor to be the first "Hispanic Supreme Court Justice." See Gonzalez, supra note 5.
The list goes on and on of the accomplishments of so many, not exclusive to the political
or legal arenas, that we have celebrated simply because they were the first person of their
race or ethnicity to achieve a particular status. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Race and ethnicity are primary identities to which we have-and
continue to-ascribe value, especially in determining how to constitute
our pluralist democracy.275 This point is aptly demonstrated by the
nominations process of the four Justices most recently appointed to the
Supreme Court, which represents by some estimates the most powerful
branch of our democratic government." 6 Debate about the propriety
of nominating a woman, a person of color, or both to the Court dominated each nomination process.2 77
But even if we were to reject a constitutional mandate of colorblindness, we need not fear an onslaught of unchecked race-consciousness. 278 In Grutter the Court applied the strict scrutiny standard,
which it has reserved exclusively for race and national-origin classifications under equal protection analysis,27 9 for the precise purpose of

275. See discussion supra Part Ill.B.
276. Chief Justice John Roberts was nominated by George W. Bush to replace Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, who died in 2005. See Jan C. Greenburg, Bush Legacy: The
Supreme Court,ABC NEWS (Jan. 12,2009), http'//abcews.go.com/TheLaw/BushLegacy/sto
ryid=6597342. Associate Justice Samuel Alito was nominated by George W. Bush to
replace retiring Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in 2005. Id. Associate Justice
Sonia Sotomayor was nominated by Barack Obama to replace retiring Associate Justice
David Souter in 2009. See ObamaPicks Elena Kaganfor Supreme Court, NBC NEWS (May
10, 2010), http-I/www.nbcnews.com/id/36967616/ns/politics-supreme court/t/obama-pickselena.kagan-supreme-cour/#VC2hxfldW4k. Associate Justice Elena Kagan was nominated
by Barack Obama to replace retiring Associate Justice John Paul Stevens in 2010. Id.
277. George W. Bush originally nominated Harriet Miers to replace outgoing Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman to serve on the Supreme Court, after much public
pressure to preserve the female representation on the Court. See Greenburg, supra note
276. However, after Miers' nomination was scuttled by her lack of judicial experience,
Bush nominated Samuel Alito to replace O'Connor. Id. Alito was ultimately confirmed by
the Senate. Id. There was then public pressure on President Obama to nominate a woman
or minority to replace Justice Souter. See Tony Mauro, Souter's Retirement Sets Stage for
Nomination Fight, NAT'L L.J. (May 4, 2009), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=
1202430398498/Souters-Retirement-Sets-Stage-for-Nomination-Fight?s
lreturn=20140902151045. He accomplished both with the nomination of Justice Sotomayor,
the first Hispanic, and the third female to serve on the Court. See Senate Confirms Sonia
Sotomayor for Supreme Court, CNN (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITIC
S/08/06/sonia.sotomayor/index.html?iref=topnews. Justice Elena Kagan's nomination was
even dominated by considerations of her sexual orientation. See generally Elena Kagan
Gay Rumor: White House Upset Over CBS News Blog, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2010),
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2010/04/16/elena-kagan-gay-rumor-whin_540143.html.
278. But see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the "unprecedented display of deference" by the majority in its application of strict scrutiny to the racebased admissions program).
279. Id. at 326-27 (majority opinion). Strict scrutiny has also been applied to alienage.
See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).
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permissible uses of race from constitutionally
sifting constitutionally
2
impermissible ones. 80
Justice O'Connor's now famous rejection of strict scrutiny as "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact," affirms the critical role of strict scrutiny in our
constitutional jurisprudence as a meaningful tool for distinguishing
between when we may, and when we may not, use race. s l If the
intended and actual function of the strict scrutiny standard is to act as
a gatekeeper for detecting constitutional uses of race, 2 the demand
for constitutional colorblindness seems not only superfluous, but
imprecise in designating all uses of race as constitutionally infirm.
So, if it is not the point of constitutional analysis to invalidate all uses
of race, and the diversity rationale acknowledges that race-consciousness
may sometimes be necessary to ensure democratic legitimacy by
expanding access for effective participation in the political process to
racial and ethnic minorities, how do we interpret and apply our
constitutional guarantee of equal protection in a manner consistent with
these constitutional principles? The answer lies in a contextualist
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.

V. A METHOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: "CONTEXT
MATTERS"
Like the theory of judicial review, the method of constitutional
interpretation is a limiting construct that preserves constitutional
integrity by wedding the exercise of judicial authority to constitutional
meaning.2s There are numerous methods of constitutional interpretation recognized in the literature, but they can be generally sorted into
two categories, originalist and non-originalist.S2
Originalism is an
interpretive method that demands fidelity to original sources of
constitutional meaning, which are most often defined as the text of the
Constitution itself and the framers' intent.'
Originalism in particular eschews contemporary sources of interpretation in decided cases.'

280. See Vargas, supra note 159, at 116.
281. Adarand Constructors,Inc., 515 U.S. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
282. See id. at 229-30. Racial classifications are unconstitutional unless they satisfy
the strict scrutiny standard. See id. at 223-24. Thus, strict scrutiny is designed to
distinguish between those racial classifications that are constitutional and those that are
not. See id. at 224.
283. See generally Berman, supra note 28.
284. See id. These categories have also been designated interpretivism and noninterpretivism. Id.
285. See id. at 411.
286. Id.
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Non-originalism, by contrast, not only accepts but embraces the use of
extra-textual and even contemporary sources for discerning constitutional meaning.28' But inadopting a broad view of constitutional meaning,
non-originalism does not reject original sources as illegitimate, or even
secondary.2' Rather, non-originalism sees these sources as necessary,
but not sufficient, to determine constitutional meaning in all cases.2 9
Additional non-originalist sources and methods for constitutional
interpretation include, among others, synthesizing abstract principles
from discrete rules of law, 290 applying contemporary values through a

method of 'living constitutionalism,"
view.

292

291

and adopting a consequentialist

Although the Court's equal protection jurisprudence arguably

reflects all of these methods and sources of constitutional interpretation,293 its context-driven analysis is perhaps most reflective of a

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. In this regard, originalism and non-originalism are not in complete tension,
and in some cases might offer no disagreement about constitutional meaning. Id.
290. See, e.g., POST,supra note 25, at 17 (describing how Justice Brennan gave cursory
treatment to the First Amendment doctrinal rules formulated in prior cases noting such
rules "can only imperfectly capture the nature and importance of the issues at stake in [a]
case" and reasoning that constitutional adjudication must "offe[r] instead an account of the
underlying function of the [Clause] and of the relationship between that function and the
[facts of the individual case to be decided]" (internal quotations ommitted)).
291. See generally Judith Olans Brown & Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Nostalgia as
ConstitutionalDoctrine:LegalizingNorman Rockwell's America, 15 VT. L. REV. 49 (1990);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting -Beyond Formalism in Constitutional Law: Constitutional
Theory Matters, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2001); POST, supra note 25.
292. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation ofStatutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986); see also Berman,
supra note 28, at 415 (describing "pragmatism" as a branch of non-originalism that
"interpret[s] the Constitution in a forward-looking manner to best secure good outcomes")
(internal quotations ommitted).
293. Strauder,for instance, derives a broad antisubordination principle from the simple
command of equal protection under the law. 100 U.S. at 306-07 (identifying the "pervading
purpose" as "protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of
those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over them"). Brown is a clear
example of living constitutionalism; the Court rejected the framers' intent as a useful
guide for adjudicating the challenge to segregated public schools in light of the changes to
public education occurring in the period between ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
and consideration of that case. 347 U.S. at 489-92 ("ITihe circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.. . cast some light, [but] it is not enough
to resolve the problem with which we are faced, ... [rather we] must consider public
").
education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life....
There have even been times when a clear consequentialist view has animated the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence, such as the firm command in Green that the only remedy
sufficient to discharge the duty under the Equal Protection Clause to desegregate public
schools in accordance with the mandate of Brown was a remedy that would work. See
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of living constitutionalism, or what I refer to here as contextualmethod
294
ism.

Contextualism as Living Constitutionalism
A contextualist method of constitutional interpretation is nonoriginalist. 295 Contextualism rejects strict construction of the Constitution in favor of a more nuanced and dynamic view of the Constitution as
a "living document" that interacts with and responds to the context in
9
That context
which any individual constitutional question arises.
the facts of
by
as
much
as
cues
social
or
can be defined by political
297
method of
contextualist
a
Although
themselves.
individual cases
constitutional
many
to
applied
been
has
constitutional interpretation
provisions,2 98 it has unique application to the Equal Protection Clause
both because of the Clause's pronounced ambiguity and because of the
vast shifts in the socio-political context that have accompanied the
299
Court's interpretation of the Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause and the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence are perhaps the greatest testaments to the Constitution

A.

Green, 391 U.S. at 439. In determining whether the "freedom of choice" plan presented
in that case met the constitutional standard for desegregation, the Court placed the burden
on the school board "to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now." Id. at 439, 440 n.5.
294. The term contextualism is adapted from the social-science literature on
multiculturalism in political theory. See Jacob T. Levy, Contextualism, Constitutionalism
and Modus Vivendi Approaches, in POLITICAL THEORY AND CULTURAL PLURALISM: NEW
DIRECTIONS (Anthony Laden & David Owen eds., Cambridge Univ. Press), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=851906.
295. See id. Originalism requires adherence to original sources for constitutional
interpretation. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. Attention to the prevailing
context when adjudicating a given constitutional question, therefore, removes this method
from the category of originalism.
296. See POST, supra note 25.
297. See generally Levy, supra note 294.
298. POST, supranote 25, at 24-25 (discussing application of "responsive interpretation"
(contextualism) to First Amendment free speech and Fifth Amendment Due Process
claims).
299. See discussion supra II.A-C. The Court's decision in Brown is an example of the
consideration of contemporary values. See 347 U.S. at 492-93 ("In approaching this
problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even
to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout."). It is also
an example of the consideration of sociological evidence. See id. at 494 ("Whatever may
have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this
finding is amply supported by modern authority.")(emphasis added)).
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as a "living document."3 °° The Fourteenth Amendment, of which the
Equal Protection Clause is a part, and the accompanying Thirteenth 0 1
and Fifteenth Amendments' 2 were designed to correct one of the
Constitution's greatest defects, the ratification of slavery,0 3 evidencing
an intent to make blacks full and equal participants in our newly
redeemed democracy.3 ' Not only are the Reconstruction Amendments
themselves a testament to the Constitution as a "living document," but
so too is the Court's evolving construction of the Equal Protection
Clause.
Legal scholars and historians agree there is no clear consensus about
the framers' intent with respect to the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause.0 5 Thus, the Clause is incapable of any "original meaning" as

that term is commonly understood and advocated.0 6 Its brevity and

300. The concept of the Constitution as dynamic and capable of accommodating itself
to evolutions of time and circumstance rather than being fixed dates to McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), where Chief Justice Marshall famously remarked, "(W~e
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding," and subsequently explained
that this constitution is "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs." Id. at 407, 415. Interestingly, even the
Supreme Court's own website acknowledges this method of constitutional interpretation.
See The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.,
http://www. supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) ("This
power of judicial review' has given the Court a crucial responsibility in assuring individual
rights, as well as in maintaining a 'living Constitution' whose broad provisions are
continually applied to complicated new situations.").
301. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
302. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
303. See The Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. at 69-71. Even Justice Clarence Thomas,
a justice prone to strictly interpreting the Constitution's meaning from its text, has
acknowledged that the Constitution's ratification of slavery was an "imperfection" in need
of correction. Simon Lazarus, The Constitutionat 225:A ConversationBetween Prof Akhil
Amar and Justice Clarence Thomas, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (Sept. 17,

2012), httpJ/theusconstitution.org/text-history/1614/constitution-225-conversation-bet weenprof-akhil-amar-and-justice-clarence-thomas.
304. Evidencing the renewed commitment to the ideal of equality embedded in our
democracy, it was Abraham Lincoln who in fact uttered the words, "government of the
people, by the people, for the people," when making his address at Gettysburg at the
dedication of the cemetery for the soldiers who had died in the battle there. See Lincoln,
supra note 12.
305. See, e.g., KULL, supra note 30; see also Brown, 347 U.S. 483; compare Strauder,
100 U.S. at 306-07 (declaring the clear import of the Clause to be "protection of the newly
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over them"), with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-97 (ascribing a broad and
ambiguous purpose to the Clause).
306. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 28. The Equal Protection Clause is not the only
constitutional provision with no original meaning. The First Amendment has been decried
as equally "devoid of [original] meaning" in the sense of the "intent of the Framers."
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ambiguity, guaranteeing only that no person shall be denied the "equal
protection of the laws," makes it equally incapable of strict construction
according to its text.3 °7
As noted and demonstrated above through a survey of equal protection
cases, the Equal Protection Clause has been subject to varying interpretation over time."'8 This variation has resulted from trying to fix the
09
in a changing socio-political
meaning of this ambiguous Clause
310
protection jurisprudence
equal
an
to
and has contributed
context,
construction.
marked most especially by a contextualist
For this reason, the Court's equal protection doctrine has been neither
static nor sacrosanct. It reflects a changing approach to changing
Throughout the Court's equal protection jurisprutimes.311
dence-beginning with its first pronouncements in The Slaughter-House
Cases up through and including its most recent construction adopting
the diversity rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger-context has been central
to the Court's understanding and interpretation of the equality
312
The Court's equal
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
has been directly
and
protection jurisprudence has been shaped by,
situated.3 1 3 For
been
has
responsive to, the context in which it

Viteritti, supra note 27, at 1123 (quoting the work ofJohn C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan,
A PoliticalHistory of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 281 (2001)).
307. Strict construction is an originalist method of constitutional interpretation that
emphasizes the text as the primary source of interpretive authority. See generallyBerman,
supra note 28.
308. See discussion supra Part HI.A-C; see also Balkin, supra note 41.
309. See Fiss, supra note 25. The text of no other provision of the Constitution of equal
import is as devoid of meaning as is the Equal Protection Clause. The words of the
Clause-"nor shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws"-are perfectly circular in their mandate to guarantee equal protection by merely
instructing that no state deny "the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1 (emphasis added). To determine the meaning of "equal protection," therefore, one must
necessarily go beyond these words to find other sources of interpretive guidance.
310. See discussion supra Part II.A-C.
311. See Fiss, supra note 25 (conducting an analysis of the development of equal
protection jurisprudence from past through present and noting the variation, abdication,
and reinterpretation of the rules adopted to enforce the Equal Protection Clause
throughout its history); see also Adams, supra note 26, at 14 (arguing that in the realm of
desegregation law in particular there has been tension and sometimes even outright
contradiction in the rules announced by the Court referring specifically to a "double
standard" established to address desegregation claims in Northern and Southern
jurisdictions).
312. See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. 309; The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36.
313. Associate Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer is a vocal and frequent
proponent of this theory ofjudicial interpretation, arguing in his book on the same subject
that "the Court should reject approaches to interpreting the Constitution that consider the
document's scope and application as fixed at the moment of framing. Rather, the Court
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instance, post-slavery Reconstruction demanded an equal protection
guarantee defined by a principle of formal antisubordinationinuring
most often, though not exclusively, to the benefit of the former
slaves.3 14
However, even as de jure discrimination fell, the de facto effects of
segregation prevailed, restricting blacks to the status of second class
citizens in all but name.315 In response, a principle of substantive
antisubordination, integration,was developed to satisfy the demands of
substantive equality that could not be met by mere fiat of non-discrimination.316 The success of the Court's integration jurisprudence, and
with it the decline of overt discrimination,3 17 spawned an equal
protection jurisprudence that turned away from remedial equality and
towards aspirational equality."' 5 This adoption of an aspirational
equality principle of antidiscrimination marked a return to formalism.3 19 In each of these periods, the Equal Protection Clause has been
interpreted by the Court to reflect the exigencies of the circumstances
and accommodate the constitutional guarantee of equality in view of the
prevailing social and political forces of the day.32

should regard the Constitution as containing unwavering values that must be applied

flexibly to ever-changing circumstances."

STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY

A JUDGE'S VIEW 75 (2010).
314. See discussion supra Part II.A.
315. See generally Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure
Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1992). This restriction was
not limited to African-Americans. Jim Crow laws often referenced "colored persons" as the
proscribed racial group even though these laws were largely understood and applied as
operating against blacks or African-Americans. Id.
316. See generally Brown, 347 U.S. 294.
317. The decline of overt discrimination is not meant to suggest the elimination of
racism, either institutional or individual. See Adam R. Pearson, John F. Dovidio & Samuel
L. Gaertner, The Nature of ContemporaryPrejudice:InsightsFromAversive Racism (2009),
http://www.yale.edu/intergroup/PearsonDovidioGaertner.pdf. Rather, it is meant to denote
a change in the nature of how discrimination was perpetrated against and experienced by
racial and ethnic minorities. Id. The integration era precipitated a more covert and
diffuse, even if still systemic, type of discrimination. See id. at 2-3. Microaggressions, for
instance, represent one form of this new type of discrimination. For an explanation and
discussion of microagressions, see Daniel Solorzano, Miguel Ceja & Tarra Yossa, Critical
Race Theory, Racial Microagressions and Campus Racial Climate: The Experiences of
African American College Students, 69 J. NEGRO EDUC. 60 (2000).
318. See JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493, 500-01; see also supra Part II.C.
319. See discussion supra Part II.C.
320. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93. As previously noted, the Court's construction
of the Equal Protection Clause also reflects other non-originalist considerations, such as
a national ethos (this coincides well with the notion of the mediating principles of equal
protection and their evolution from a historical remedial guarantee to a modem
construction of equal protection as aspirational), as well as consequentialist concerns. In
WORK:
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Contemporaneous evidence and socio-political context have figured
prominently in the development of the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence." 1
322
In its analysis in Loving v. Virginia, the Court aptly demonstrated
its reliance on context. One of the last vestiges of the former system 3of
23
de jure segregation to be dismantled was antimiscegenation laws.
By the time Loving was decided, the social and political tide had
definitively begun to shift. This shift was so remarkable that the Court
took judicial notice of the fact that in 1967, the year of the decision, only
sixteen states continued to prohibit interracial marriage and that
fourteen states had repealed their miscegenation laws over the preceding
The Court expressly rejected Virginia's originalist
fifteen years."
contention that antimiscegenation laws were not intended to be made
3
unconstitutional by the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. "
Defining the object of the antimiscegenation statute as "maintain[ing]
White Supremacy," the Court struck down the statute as an infringement of the equal protection rights of non-white citizens and as
inconsistent with the Court's then prevailing equal protection jurispru3 6
dence of formal antisubordination.
This contextualist construction takes account of the evolving context
in which equal protection cases have been decided, but does not dispense
with originalist considerations altogether. Rather, the contextualist
method also reconciles the Equal Protection327 Clause to the equality
principles that first animated its ratification.

particular, the iconic Brown case reflected deep concern for the psychological harm to black
students from attending segregated schools in announcing that segregation in public
education is "inherently unequal." See id. at 494 & n.ll, 495.
321. The Slaughter-House Cases cited specifically to the recent events of slavery,
emancipation, and the Civil War in general to ascribe an antisubordination meaning to the
Clause, thereby denying the claims of white butchers who sought to assert claims for equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See
83 U.S. at 57-59, 66, 68-72, 81. In Brown, the sociological study of Kenneth Clark figured
prominently in the Court's consideration of whether segregation in public schools was
damaging to black children. 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.

322. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

323. See generally id. (striking down law banning interracial marriages).
324. Id. at 6 & n.5.
325. Id. at 9 ("A]lthough these historical sources 'cast some light' they are not
sufficient to resolve the problem; '[at] best, they are inconclusive.'" (quoting Brown, 347
U.S. at 489)).
326. Id. at 11-12.
327. Notwithstanding the original source of these principles, a non-originalst theory
of constitutional interpretation might also consider the evolving national ethos in
construing these principles in decided cases. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified
in the aftermath of the Civil War, represents a political pact to make
good on the abandoned promise of constitutional equality.32s The
Clause has both historic force and doctrinal significance for how we
construct legal principles to further our constitutional commitment to
equality.3 ' In the first case to explicate the meaning of the Clause,
just four short years after its ratification, the Supreme Court was clear
on the import of the moment and its implication for setting in motion the
trajectory of all future equal protection jurisprudence:
We do not conceal from ourselves the great responsibility which th[e]
duty [to give construction to these articles] devolves upon us. No
questions so farreaching and pervading in their consequences... and
so important in their bearing upon the relations of the United States
...

and to the citizens of the States and of the United States, have

been before this court.. .. '
Acknowledging the historic force of its opinion on future equal
protection jurisprudence, the Court carefully constructed a doctrinal
principle that was explicit in its reference to the remedial impetus of the
Amendment,"' but that also left open the possibility of an equality

328. Speaking eloquently during his historic Gettysburg Address, President Lincoln
described the pact as follows:
Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new
nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal.... [W]e here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in
vain, that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that
government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the
earth.
Lincoln, supra note 12.
329. See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 40, at 1066-67 (arguing that the history
surrounding ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment should be a central tool in
constructing the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause).
330. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 67.
331. See id. at 81. In construing the Reconstruction Amendments as a whole, the Court
declared emphatically,
"[Iln any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these amendments,
it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the pervading spirit
of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy,.. . until that purpose
was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accomplish it."
Id. at 72. The Court further noted, "We doubt very much whether any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision." Id. at 81.
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principle that could transcend the immediate circumstance of its
making.3 32
Since then, the Court has continued to wrestle with the precise
meaning and exact contours of the equality principle to be derived from
the Equal Protection Clause. Many scholars have criticized the Court's
more recent doctrinal retreat from earlier periods of enforcing the Equal
Protection Clause's antisubordination principle to instead enforcing an
3 Implicit in this critique is a claim that
antidiscrimination principle.
the Court has abandoned the pursuit of substantive equality in its
retreat to formalism.3"
But the Court's recent embrace of the diversity rationale evinces yet
another shift in the Court's equality doctrine, and with it a return to
substantive equality over formalism. Given the importance of context to
understanding the Court's evolving equal protection jurisprudence, it is
necessary to highlight the context in which this most recent shift has
occurred. This shift has occurred in a particular socio-political context
that demonstrates both its logic and urgency for ensuring the democratic
3
pluralism to which we have long aspired under our Constitution.
The present context in which the Court has adopted this new substantive principle of antidiscrimination is unlike those of the past and
requires a view of equal protection uniquely tailored to meet these
present exigencies.3 36 Old notions of equality defined by the tensions
white
between racial and ethnic minorities on the one hand and the
37
context.
new
this
in
reconceived
be
must
other
the
on
majority
332. See id. at 72, 81. Declining to restrict the commitment to equality contained in
the Amendments to the historic context, the Court explicitly qualified its immediate
construction as inuring exclusively to the benefit of the former slaves by cautioning, "We
do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection." Id. at 72. And
speaking directly to construction of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court noted that it
was not then being called upon to adjudicate "any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race." Id. at 81.
333. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Even as the Court has scaled back its
doctrinal commitment to a substantive antisubordination principle that seeks to protect
racial and ethnic minorities from discrimination and moved towards a formal antidiscrimination principle of race-neutrality that inures more often to the benefit of whites, it has
continued to evince a strong rhetorical commitment to a broad vision of equality, including
on behalf of racial and ethnic minorities. See, e.g., ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701; Grutter,
539 U.S. 306; Adarand Constructors,Inc., 515 U.S. 200; Shaw, 509 U.S. 630; J.A Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469.
334. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
335. See generally Jones, supra note 19.
336. Id.
337. The antisubordination principles (formal and substantive) reflected a constitutional concern for the tensions between an oppressive white majority and subordinated racial
and ethnic minorities. See supra Part If.A-C. Even though the formal antidiscrimination
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B.

Present Context: The Reality of Our Inequality
Over the last two decades, the United States has rapidly diversified.3 38 In 1990, more than three-quarters of the population selfidentified as White, non-Hispanic. 39 By 2000, that number was just
above two-thirds.' ° In 2010, 64% of Americans self-identified as
White, non-Hispanic." By 2042, it is estimated the United States will
be a nation comprised of a majority of racial and ethnic "minorities."3 2
There are already four majority-minority states in addition to the
District of Columbia3 3 two of which are the largest of all the states
by population size. 44 Surpassing African-Americans in the 2000
Census, Hispanics are now the largest ethnic minority group in the
United States, 345 while Asian-Americans are the fastest growing racial
principle shifted the focus to race-neutrality, it did so as a means of preserving the rights
of the white majority against infringement by aggressive remedial relief on behalf of racial
and ethnic minorities. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 234, 237-38. Thus, the
object of mediating tensions between a white majority on the one hand and racial and
ethnic minorities on the other hand remained unchanged even in the shift from a
substantive antisubordination to a formal antidiscrimination principle. Given the shifting
demographics of the country, this tension has shifted and with it the mediating principle
must also shift.
338. See KAREN R. HUMES, NICHOLAS A. JONES & ROBERTO R. RAMIREZ, OVERVIEW OF
RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2011), availableat http'J/www.census.gov/prod/cenl02O/briefs/clO2Obr-02.pdf. Over the last decade (between 2000 and
2010), the Hispanic population has grown by 43%; the black population by 12%, and the
Asian/Pacific Islander population by 43%. Id. at 3-5. Over the same period, the total
percentage share of the white population has contracted by 7%. Id. at 5.
339. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1990 U.S. CENSUS, tbl. 1.
340. See ELIZABETH M. GRIECO, THE WHITE POPULATION: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(2001), available at http'J/www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbrO1-4.pdf.
341. See HUMES, ET AL., supra note 338, at 3.
342. See Sam Roberts, Minoritiesin U.S. Set to Become Majority by 2042, N.Y. TIMES,
http'//www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14world/americas/14iht-census.1.15284537.thmlr=0 (last
visited Sept. 28, 2014). Already today, 49.7% of U.S. residents under the age of five are
racial and ethnic "minorities." See Most ChildrenYounger Than Age 1 Are Minorities,U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (May 17,2012), availableat https'J/www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cbl2-90.html [hereinafter Most Children].
343. See Most Children, supra note 342. The four states with a majority-minority
population are California, Texas, New Mexico, and Hawaii. Id.
344. See PAUL CAMPBELL, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION PROJECTIONS:
STATES, 1995-2025, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (1997), availableat httpJ/www.census.gov/prod
/2/pop/p25/p25-1131.pdf (identifying California and Texas as the first- and second-largest
states). Eleven percent of the 3,143 U.S. counties are also majority-minority. See Most
Children, supra note 342.
345. See ELIZABETH M. GRIECO & RACHEL C. CASSIDY, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, at tbl. 1 (2001), availableat http://www.cen
sus.govJprod/2001pubs/c2kbr0l-1.pdf (reflecting a Hispanic population rate of 12.5% and
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group in the country.3 46 America is not just browning, it is increasingly becoming a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multi-hued nation.
The changing hue of the American public stands in stark contrast to
the intractable homogeneity of our civic leadership. The election of
Barack Obama, the first non-white President of the United States, was
indeed a historic moment for our country. His election signaled to many
that the civic equality to which we have long aspired, and which many
37
But we have not yet
thought we might never achieve, is possible.
38
arrived. " Even as we elected the first African-American President,
we continue to suffer from an intolerable lack of diversity among the
349
highest echelons of our nation's civic leadership.
The irony of President Obama's election is that it came at the350expense
Curof the then sole black member of the United States Senate.

a black population rate of 12.3%).
346. See HUMES, ET AL., supra note 338, at 5. While the population as a whole grew
by 13% in the last decade of the twentieth century, the Asian population jumped by 72%
and the Hispanic population by almost 60%. LOPEZ, supra note 250, at 153. The current
racial and ethnic demographics of the United States (as of 2010) are as follows: white, not
Hispanic 63.7%; Hispanic 16.3%; black 12.6%; Asian/Pacific Islander 5.0%; American
Indian/Native American 0.9%. HUMES, ET AL., supra note 338, at tbl. 1. The remainder
are persons of mixed race. Id.
347. See, e.g., David Jones, The Day the World Thought Would Never Happen: Barack
Obama Takes Oath as America's First Black President, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 21, 2009),
www.dailymal.co.uk/news/article-1124682/The-day-world-thought-happen-Barack-Obamatakes-oath-Americas-black-president.html; Paul Steinhauser, In Poll, African-Americans
Say ElectionA 'DreamCome True,' CNN (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/1Ii11Iobama.polI.
348. Claims of a "post-racial" America peaked around the time of President Obama's
inauguration. See, e.g., Anthea Butler, 'PostRacial'? No: With a Black PresidentAll Issues
Are Racialized, MSNBC (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbcIost-racial. By
'post-racial" most commentators mean that race is no longer a salient fact of life for most
Americans, and we have largely transcended race as a divisive social and political issue as
a nation. See Earnest Harris, We Are Not Post RacialJust Yet, HUFFINGTON POST (May
25,2011), http./www.huffingtonpost.com/eamest-harris/we-are-not-post-racial-ju-b-158978.html. Such claims were and remain grossly premature. See id. In fact, President
Obama's election itself has been the largest source of evidence to the contrary. See id.
Moreover, accounts of overt racism and racial hostility against blacks and Hispanics are
reported on a near daily basis in the popular media. See, e.g., F. Brinley Bruton & Richie
Duchon, Ferguson, Missouri's Police Chief Joins Michael Brown Protesters,NBC NEWS
(Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting/ferguson76
2 2
missouris-police-chief-joins-michael-brown-protesters-n l 0 .
349. See infra notes 351-54 and accompanying text.
350. See Robert Koenig, Roland Burris, Senate's Sole African American, Preparesto
Depart,Eyes ChicagoMayor's Race, SANT LOUIS BEACON (Nov. 5,2010), http://www.stlbeacon.org/#Vcontent/17672/senates-sole-aftrican-americanrolandburris-disturbedat-lack.
was
ofblack senatorseyes_chicagomayorsrace. Roland Burris, an African-American,
the
appointed by the Governor of Illinois to replace Barack Obama when he assumed
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rently only 7% of the 100 Senators are racial or ethnic minorities. 351
Of 439 Representatives in the House, 20% are minorities.35 2 State
elected officials are equally lacking in racial and ethnic diversity.3 53
Of the fifty governors, only five (10%) are non-white. 54 Our appointed
officials fare no better if you consider the diversity of federal judges, less
355
than 15% of whom are racial and ethnic minorities.
In embracing the diversity rationale, the Court in Grutter acknowledged the threat to the legitimacy of our constitutional vision for
pluralist democracy arising from the growing disparity between the
diversity of our citizens and the whiteness-and maleness-of our polity,
by recognizing,
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All
members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the
openness and integrity of the educationalinstitutionsthat provide this
355
training.

This acknowledgement that only a diverse set of leaders will have
legitimacy in the eyes of a diverse citizenry cautions against the
continued homogeneity of our congressional, executive, judicial, and
other civic leaders at the federal, state, and local levels of government
in the face of exponential increases in the racial and ethnic diversity of
our population.3 57 Ian Haney-Lopez has already offered one vision of

presidency, but Burris was defeated in the 2010 mid-term election by Mark Kirk, a white
male. Id.
351. See JENNIFER E. MANNING, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 113TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (2014). Two are African-American, but both were appointed rather
than elected. Id. at 8. Four are Hispanic, and one is Asian-American. Id.
352. Id. Forty-two (9.5%) are African-American, thirty-three (7.5%) are Hispanic, and
twelve (2.7%) are Asian Pacific American. Id. Only two (0.4%) members of the House are
American Indian/Native American. Id.
353. See generally Political Party and the Demographics of America's Governors,
POLITIKAL BLOG (Oct. 13, 2011), http/mypolitikal.com/2011/10/13/political-party-and-thedemographics-of-americas-governors/.
354. Id. Two (4%) are Hispanic-Governors Susana Martinez of New Mexico and Brian
Sandoval of Nevada. Id. Two (4%) are Asian-American-Governors Nikki Haley of South
Carolina and Bobby Jindal of Louisiana. Id. One (2%) is African-American-Governor
Deval Patrick of Massachusetts. Id.
355. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
356. 539 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added).
357. This diversity should be reflective of more than just racial and ethnic diversity,
and should be judged by the extent to which all politically salient groups effectively
participate in our democracy, including specifically women, and increasingly, LGBTQ
persons. See discussion supra note 33 (discussing why this paper focuses exclusively on
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a looming dystopian reality if we stay the current course of colorblind
constitutionalism under a principle of formal antidiscrimination.3'
The diversity rationale is an attempt to correct course by countering that
grim reality with a reconceived vision of equal protection; one that once
again eschews formalism and turns to substantive equality as a means
of ensuring "equal protection of the laws," defined under this new
aspirational principle as "[elffective participation by members of all
"
racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation.
C. A Rejoinder: The Diversity Rationale
The diversity rationale situates our equal protection guarantee and the
aspirational principle of substantive antidiscrimination, which now
animates that guarantee, within the context of a pluralist democracy
that is increasingly threatened with illegitimacy. According to Justice
O'Connor in Grutter, democratic legitimacy is contingent on the
following: (1) "the path to leadership [must] be visibly open to talented
' 60
(2) everyone
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity;
"must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational
61
institutions that provide this training;"' and (3) racial and ethnic
minorities must effectively participate "in the civic life of our Nation." 2 The decision in Grutter was immediately responsive to the
first and second requirements by ensuring that educational institutions
are legitimized as the primary path to civic leadership as a result of
3 3
The third
their openness to people of all races and ethnicities.
requirement, however, is not addressed directly in Grutter,but indicates

race). The Court has recognized that gender is deserving of heightened equal protection,
see Craig,429 U.S. 190 (applying heightened equal protection scrutiny to gender), and the
Court increasingly has recognized that LGBTQ persons are equally deserving of heightened
equal protection scrutiny. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
358. See LOPEZ, supra note 250, at 162.
359. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.

363. See id. at 343. This is the reason why the majority highlighted the significance
of law schools in particular as a suitable context for vindicating our pluralist ambitions,
noting that "[individuals with law degrees occupy roughly half the state governorships,
more than half the seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of the seats
in the United States House of Representatives." Id. at 332. The majority further
concluded that not just public law schools, but all selective schools shared this obligation
because of their influence in training future civic leaders, noting, "A handful of these
schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States Courts of
Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States District Court judges."
Id.
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the potential impact of the diversity rationale in extending its guarantee
of substantive equality to all the various sites of democratic participation
that are reflective of the "civic life of our Nation." It reflects a commitment that, in addition to opening the pathways to leadership through
education, the Equal Protection Clause also has the power to ensure
racial and ethnic minorities effectively participate in the leadership of
the civic institutions that comprise our democracy."
Racial and ethnic minorities comprise an ever-increasing share of our
citizenry, and their political salience continues to be reinforced through
the ongoing legitimation of race.. and the perpetuation of identity
politics."6
In this socio-political context, our aspirations for pluralist
democracy are undermined if a growing share of these citizens view the
government with increasing suspicion and apathy because they remain
effectively shut out of the processes that constitute self-governance. So
long as the population rates for racial and ethnic minorities far outpace
their participation rates in the deliberative and political processes of
government, racial and ethnic minorities will view our democracy as
illegitimate. 7 When our democratic leaders, selected "by the people,"
fail to be representative of the racial and ethnic diversity "of the people,"
it undermines the legitimacy of our claim that government is "for the
people." The diversity rationale, and the substantive antidiscrimination
principle it represents, offers a prescription for restoring the legitimacy
of our pluralist democracy.
D.

A Way Forward:Diversity, Democracy & Pluralism
Implicit in the unique and wonderful experiment in democracy that is
America is a deep and abiding belief that we not only welcome people of
diverse backgrounds, but we also guarantee that all citizens have the

364. See generally id.
365. See Gotanda, supra note 154. Race has been legitimized as a social construct, not
a biological construct. See id. Notwithstanding its irrelevance for many purposes, it has
significant meaning for ordering our social relations and informing the terms of the socialcompact instinct in our democratic form of self-government. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw (5th ed. 2004) (arguing that it is disingenuous for the
government to on the one hand require racialization by counting race as part of countless
political processes, while on the other hand decrying racialization and emphasizing
colorblindness).
366. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., Eskridge, Pluralism and Distrust, supra note 166. One of the gravest
consequences of citizens viewing government as illegitimate is the prospect that this

rejection will be expressed in ways that are destructive to the stability and security of our
democracy. See id. at 1297 (suggesting that the failure of pluralist democracy might cause
those shut out of the political process to revolt against it).

2015]

THE REALITY OF OUR INEQUALITY

643

opportunity to effectively participate in the political and civic life of our
Nation. In order to realize this vision of pluralist democracy, it is not
enough to espouse a rhetoric of equality, or to apply our equal protection
guarantee in a way that ensures only a formal-equality norm of nondiscrimination without also ensuring the substantive guarantee of equal
participation. Ensuring that our Founding Fathers' constitutional design
for a pluralist democracy keeps pace with the changing racial and ethnic
3 8
demographics of our nation is a tall order to be sure. " The promise
of effective participation by racial and ethnic minorities in the civic life
of our nation is not without its challenges.
In particular, the pluralist vision of equal protection embodied by the
diversity rationale raises two important concerns. First is the concern
that the goal of effective participation by racial and ethnic minorities is
tantamount to an impermissible racial quota.369 Second, even conceding the necessity of effective participation by racial and ethnic minorities
in our pluralist democracy, some might argue that the demand for
descriptive representation inherent in the diversity rationale is
unnecessary and instead suggest that substantive representation should
be preferred.3 70
I will consider each of these important claims and offer some thoughts
on why they are ineffective to defeat the equal protection claims of those
racial and ethnic minorities who are deprived of the opportunity for selfgovernance through effective participation in those civic institutions that
serve as the sites of our deliberative and political processes.
Demands by racial and ethnic minorities for effective participation in
the political process through descriptive representation have long been
criticized as calls for racial quotas.3 7' However, it is useful to remember that the applicable strict scrutiny standard is specifically calibrated
to distinguish between permissible uses of race and impermissible uses

368. See generally Pildes, supra note 194 (describing the difficulty democracies have

keeping pace with changes in ethnic identity or composition even when structured to be

accommodating of ethnic identity interests at formation).
369. Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. Grutter sanctioned student body diversity as a

compelling interest so long as the pursuit was for a "critical mass of underrepresented
minority students" and not an impermissible racial quota. 539 U.S. at 335-36.
370. See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 495. The strict scrutiny standard requires both
that the interest be sufficiently compelling to justify the use of race and that the use of race
be necessary to the achievement of that objective. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. In this
regard we must demonstrate the necessity of descriptive representation as a race-conscious
means of achieving effective political participation by racial and ethnic minorities.
371. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 244, at ix (describing how critics responded to

Guinier's calls for effective descriptive representation on behalf of racial and ethnic
minority voters by calling her a "Quota Queen").
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of racial quotas. 72 Thus, the race-consciousness of the demand for
descriptive representation does not render it per se unconstitutional."
The law of equal protection has long recognized that proportionate
representation for racial and ethnic minorities can be constitutionally
required. 4 This is true because pluralist democratic design necessarily seeks to accommodate and incorporate effective participation by racial
and ethnic minority groups in the process of self-governance. 75
Democracy cannot, therefore, be legitimized without a mechanism for
incorporating racial and ethnic minority groups into the deliberative and
political processes. 76 These mechanisms are often calibrated at the
time of democratic formation but prove ineffective as population shifts
alter the composition and political salience of these groups over
time. 77
As a consequence, Richard Pildes suggests that courts can serve a
legitimate institutional function, akin to Ely's representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review, to update these mechanisms to better
account for these demographic shifts.3 78 This is what the Court did in
approving the diversity rationale. Exercising the representationreinforcement power of judicial review, the Court in Grutter recognized
the need to recalibrate our process for selecting democratic leaders in a
twenty-first century context marked by shifting racial and ethnic
concentrations, 9 the entrenchment of racial and ethnic political
identity,3" and political channels clogged by an increasing white
minority.3"' To define effective participation in this context, we can

372. See supra note 282 and accompanying text (discussing the function of strict
scrutiny as a tool for distinguishing constitutionally impermissible uses of race from
constitutionally permissible ones).
373. Id.
374. See, e.g., White, 412 U.S. 55; Whitcomb, 403 U.S. 124; Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533;
Baker, 369 U.S. 186.
375. See generally Pildes, supra note 194.
376. Id.
377. Id.; see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 237 (finding a constitutional equal protection
violation where Tennessee's legislative apportionment had not been changed since 1901
notwithstanding significant shifts in the state's demography).
378. See Pildes, supra note 194, at 3-4. Pildes's argument in this regard was used to
justify the Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and subsequent cases,
such as Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 74 (1994), and Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003),
restricting the application of the Voting Rights Act as a means to create "safe minority
election districts" in view of prevailing pressures to ameliorate racially polarized voting
exacerbated by racial gerrymandering for the purpose of creating safe minority election
districts. See generally Pildes, supra note 194.
379. See supra Part V.A.
380. See supra Part Ill.B.
381. See supra notes 351-54 and accompanying text.
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2
look both to the "critical mass" standard approved in Grutter,3 as well
proportionate representation standard from the Voting Rights
as to the
383

cases.

The Court's approval of the "critical mass" standard in Grutter
acknowledges that some attention to numbers is permissible, notwithstanding the Court's rejection of racial quotas as per se unconstitutionIn the same way, we should be permitted to give some attention
al.'
to numbers in ensuring effective participation by racial and ethnic
minorities in the various civic institutions of our democracy without
running afoul of the constitutional prohibition on racial quotas. This
attention to numbers in assessing the adequacy of effective political
participation by racial and ethnic minorities was also invoked in the
early one-person, one-vote cases. 3" This acknowledgement that some
achievement of proportionate representation is a necessary precondition
to the effective functioning of our democratic government is, therefore,
not foreign to our equal protection jurisprudence. Invoking this calculus
to ensure racial and ethnic minorities have the opportunity to effectively
participate in the various deliberative processes of government outside
of electoral politics is in keeping with our equal protection jurisprudence.
The demand for substantive representation, rather than descriptive
representation, can be countered on several grounds. First, it is not
entirely clear that substantive representation trumps descriptive
representation as a means of effectively vindicating the political
interests of racial and ethnic minority groups, particularly as politics
become more racially polarized. 8' This is especially true because it is

382. See 539 U.S. 335-56 (discussing the permissible use of a "critical mass" standard
for determining adequate diversity of a student body in higher education).
383. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker, 369 U.S. 186 (discussing
the use of the proportionate representation standard).
384. See 539 U.S. at 335-36.
385. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8-9 (applying the one-person-one-vote standard to
federal congressional districts); Baker, 369 U.S. at 237 (concluding that differences in the
size of state legislative districts are a justiciable issue under the Equal Protection Clause
and establishing the one-person, one-vote standard for legislative districting); see also
Hayden, supra note 205 (discussing the same topic).
386. See Royce Brooks, Electing One of Our Own: The Importanceof Black Representatives for Black Communities in the Context of Local Government, 3 AM. U. MODERN AM. 33,
37-38 (2007) (describing an expressed preference for descriptive representation over
substantive representation in local elections where the need for effective interest
representation is most acute). Rather than asserting that white elected officials represent
the political interests of racial and ethnic minorities as well as, or better than, minority
elected officials, the argument favoring substantive representation over descriptive
representation appears to do so only because of the loss of aggregate democratic power in
creating majority-minority voting districts. See, e.g., Hayden, supra note 205 (describing
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questionable whether those elected by racial and ethnic minorities on the
basis of substantive representation maintain their election commitments
to racial and ethnic minorities when political compromise becomes
necessary.3 7 Further, it is often assumed that substantive representation means the interests of racial and ethnic minorities are adequately
represented by members of the white majority."~ However, as racial
and ethnic minorities assume majority status, it is equally plausible that
substantive representation should mean that an increasingly white
minority can be adequately represented by new racial and ethnic
"majority-minority" political leaders. Thus, descriptive and substantive
representation would coalesce for racial and ethnic minorities as they do
now for the white majority.
The final, and perhaps most important, counter to the claim of
substantive, rather than descriptive, representation is that substantive
representation does nothing to address the problem of democratic
legitimacy, even if it accomplishes some other democratic goal. 89 The
diversity rationale is an acknowledgement that our ambitions for
pluralist democracy are only legitimized when racial and ethnic
minorities (especially when they represent a demographic majority)
actually participate in the deliberative and political processes of
government, not merely when others purport to represent their interests.
This legitimizing function can only be achieved through descriptive
representation. 390

the tradeoff between descriptive and substantive representation as the net political loss
arising from the descriptive representation from majority-minority districts and the decline
in overall substantive representation of the Democratic Party); see also BRUCE E. CAIN,
THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE (1984); Robert S. Erikson, Malapportionment,Gerrymandering,and PartyFortunesin CongressionalElections,66 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1234, 1241-44
(1972) (predicting the tradeoff effect of racially gerrymandered majority-minority electoral
districts).
387. See Brooks, supra note 386, at 37-38; see also Karlan, supra note 194, at 1336 &
n.32 (explaining how "[olne of the factors on which the Court relied" in White to create
majority-minority districts was "the nonresponsiveness of elected officials to the particular
concerns of minority communities" and noting how the political commitments of these
candidates lacked "good-faith").
388. See generally Hayden, supra note 205.
389. See supra note 386. Such goals include adequate representation of minorities'
substantive political interests. Id.
390. It is also worth noting that the issue of descriptive representation in political
appointments does not present the same tensions with substantive representation as are
presented by electoral politics. Appointments will always be made by the controlling
political party. So, to the extent substantive representation is concerned with ideological
commitments, selection on that basis will be predetermined by the appointing party.
Either party, however, remains able, notwithstanding a commitment to substantive
representation, to consider the extent to which increasing descriptive representation will
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To legitimize our democracy in the eyes of our diverse citizenry, we
must ensure effective participation by racial and ethnic minorities in the
deliberative and political processes of government. I have offered the
example of judicial appointments as just one context in which the
diversity rationale demands we attend to meaningful diversity among
our civic leaders.39 1 But political appointments can, and should be,
influenced by these diversity considerations in federal executive
appointments, as well as in all political appointments, and even civil
service employment, at the national, state, and local levels of government.392
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Equal Protection Clause has always been an evolving doctrine of
law. Our equal protection jurisprudence has been one of incremental,
progressive justice. Applying a contextualist method of constitutional
interpretation, the Court has continuously aspired to realize the
guarantee of equality within the prevailing socio-political context,
evolving our equal protection jurisprudence from a doctrine of "separate
but equal" to the recognition that "separate is inherently unequal" and
acknowledging that equality in principle is not sufficient to effect
equality in practice.393
In addition to realizing the remedial aims of an antisubordination
principle, our equal protection doctrine also reflects an antidiscrimination principle that recognizes the inherent equality of all, and endeavors
3 94
to provide equal opportunity to all regardless of race or ethnicity.

enhance democratic legitimacy for racial and ethnic minorities.
391. See JENNIFER E. MANNING, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 113TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (2014).

392. Evidence already exists of these considerations operating in the political
appointment and civil service processes. See, e.g., FDICInitiatives Under the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
reformfmitiatives.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). Moreover, courts have already
extended the diversity rationale to these other public domains. See, e.g., Alexander v. City
of Milwaukee, 474 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging the legitimacy of the diversity
rationale for police hiring, but holding that the plan at issue was not narrowly tailored);
Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding the diversity rationale
in the context of police hiring); but see Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303 (3d Cir.
2006) (rejecting the diversity rationale in the context of a fire department transfer policy).
For a full discussion of the Court's treatment of diversity as a legitimate consideration in
public employment, see Stacy Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas
Standard:Mounting an Effective Title VII Defense of the Commitment to Diversity in the
Legal Profession, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming).
393. Supra note 42 and accompanying text.
394. Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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However, we have come to realize that just as a formal principle of
antisubordination was inadequate to achieve full remediation of de jure
discrimination, a formal antidiscrimination principle is equally incapable
of achieving our full aspirational equality ideals. We are now called
upon to embrace the next step on our constitutional journey toward the
full and "equal protection of the laws" for all persons. Equal protection
demands recognition of-and must give effect to-the ideal of pluralist
democracy embodied by our Constitution, acknowledging that equality
and pluralism are mutually coextensive in the vision of democracy
contemplated by our forefathers. Equal protection without effective
participation leaves a fundamental promise of the Constitution
unfulfilled.
The Supreme Court's embrace of the diversity rationale in Grutter v.
Bollinger was an attempt to fulfill that promise. 95 By continuing the
contextualist tradition of interpreting our equal protection guarantee in
light of the prevailing social and political forces of the day, the Court, in
Grutter, offered a prescription for resolving the tensions that have
developed between our aspirational equality ideals and the reality of our
inequality. The Court's decision has breathed new life into the ideal of
pluralist democracy, first conceived by our forefathers to protect
"minorities" from political tyranny by the "majority," or worse yet the
"majority" from tyranny by a "minority." Bridging the gap between our
aspirations of pluralist democracy and the growing reality of "colorblind
white dominance" is the aim of the diversity rationale. The Court
properly invoked its representation-reinforcement power of judicial
review to clear the channels of political change for present and future
generations of Americans.396
Today there are too many courtrooms, administrative agencies,
municipal bodies, and other civic institutions where racial and ethnic
minorities are deprived of the opportunity to effectively participate in
the process of democratic self-governance. This undermines the
legitimacy of our democracy for a growing share of citizens. When we
have effectively incorporated the vast and growing numbers of racial and
ethnic minorities that comprise our citizenry into the civic institutions
that serve as the sites for our deliberative politics, the pluralist
democracy our Founding Fathers so carefully designed, and the full
constitutional guarantee of equal protection, will be realized-a democracy imbued with the principle that "all men are created equal"9 7 and

395. Supra note 216 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
397. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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a government "of [all] the people, by [all] the people, for [all] the
people." 39 8

398. Lincoln, supra note 12.

